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ABSTRACT
WORRY IN CHILDREN: PROPOSAL AND TEST OF A COGNITIVE MODEL
Sarah Jane Kertz
September 10th, 2010

Although worry is common in children, little is known about its development and
maintenance. The current study reviews several areas of the literature to inform a
comprehensive cognitive model of clinical worry in children. Parental influences on child
anxiety broadly are reviewed, followed by a discussion of empirically supported
cognitive models of worry in adult samples. Next, the potential impact of cognitive
development on childhood worry is presented. A cognitive model is then proposed, and
empirical support for the model is reviewed. Finally, a portion of the model is identified
and tested empirically. Specifically, this study tests the hypothesis that cognitive
development will predict the cognitive variables of threat interpretation, beliefs about
worry, negative problem orientation, and intolerance of uncertainty (IU). It is also
hypothesized that the cognitive variables will predict worry and that this association will
be moderated by child development, such that the predictive power of the cognitive
variables increases with child development. It was also hypothesized that female children
will score higher than male children on the four cognitive variables and on measures of
worry. Finally, it was predicted that scores on the cognitive variables will discriminate
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children with clinical levels of worry from those with nonclinicallevels of worry.
Children were recruited from public and private schools. A total of 80 children between
the ages of 8 and 12 years completed the study. Overall, hypotheses were partially
supported. Cognitive development, as measured by child age, explained variance in
intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about
worry. Intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs
about worry significantly predicted worry, and negative beliefs about worry emerged as
the strongest predictor. Threat interpretation and positive beliefs about worry were not
correlated with worry. Female children reported higher levels of negative beliefs about
worry and negative problem orientation, but not worry. Finally, intolerance of
uncertainty, negative beliefs about worry, and negative problem orientation discriminated
clinical from nonclinicallevels of worry. Exploratory analyses examined potential
developmental trends in associations between the cognitive variables and worry. Findings
are discussed in terms of theoretical and clinical implications and suggestions for future
research are offered.
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INTRODUCTION

Worry is common in both children and adults. As many as 70% of children in a
community sample report worry about a number of things (Orton, 1982) and 30% report
subclinical levels of worry (Bell-Dolan, Last, & Strauss, 1990). Although childhood
worry itself is not unusual, worry that is excessive, uncontrollable, and associated with
distress is considered a clinical concern. Such worry is the cardinal feature of Generalized
Anxiety Disorder (GAD) in both children and adults. Prevalence estimates of GAD in
children suggest that the disorder is not uncommon, with rates ranging from .16% to
8.8% of community samples (Cartwright-Hatton, 2006). GAD has a chronic course, and
many adults report that their worries began in childhood (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). The frequency, associated distress, and persistence of childhood
worry highlight the importance of understanding this issue.
Although GAD is a chronic disorder frequently beginning early in life, little is
known about specific etiological or maintaining factors of worry in children. To date
most work has examined the content of child worry and patterns of associated symptoms
described in DSM-IV (e.g., Hale, Raaijmakers, Muris, van Hoof, & Meeus, 2008; Muris,
Merckelbach, & Luijten, 2002; Silverman, La Greca, & Wasserstein, 1995; Tracey,
Chorpita, Douban, & Barlow, 1997; Vasey, Crnic, & Carter, 1994; Weems, Silverman, &
La Greca, 2000). Exciting new work has examined the role of cognitive factors in
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adolescents (Gosselinet ai., 2007; Laugesen, Dugas, & Bukowski, 2003) and shed light
on the applicability of adult cognitive models to younger populations. Still, work with
children is rare and the impact of cognitive development on models of worry has yet to be
fully explored (see Ellis & Hudson, 2010, for an exception). Currently, most researchers
and clinicians borrow models from the adult literature, operating under the assumption
that a downward extension of these models is appropriate for children.
Although downward extensions are common, applying adult models to children
without empirical testing is problematic for several reasons. First, it has been suggested
that childhood psychopathology is generally understood best in terms of the broader
family interaction pattern (Dadds, 1987; Patterson & Reid, 1984). For children, a
significant amount of time is spent in the home and with the family, where parents play
an important role in shaping children's beliefs, perceptions, and experiences. A failure to
consider the role of parents in childhood anxiety may lead to an incomplete
understanding of the disorder. Second, children differ from adults in terms of their
cognitive, emotional, and social development. Until late adolescence, children grow and
develop cognitively. Whether such abilities impact the experience or expression of
childhood worry is not well understood. For example, children's ability to conceptualize
the future and elaborate on potential threat may impact their capacity for experiencing
generalized anxiety (Vasey, 1993). Models of childhood worry should consider if the
cognitive variables implicated in adult models are important for models of children's
worry and test hypotheses to determine if development affects the extent to which such
models apply.
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Applying adult models to child anxiety without testing is also problematic
because such models guide the development of treatment interventions. Without testing
whether adult models accurately capture the experience of worry in children, treatments
may be less effective. For example, some evidence suggests that current cognitive
behavioral interventions are successful for only 60% of anxious children (CartwrightHatton, Roberts, Chitsabesan, Fothergill, & Harrington, 2004). To date, no cognitivebehavioral treatment targeted specifically at youth with GAD exists (Albano & Hack,
2004). A comprehensive and well-defined model of GAD and worry in children will
provide clear targets for treatment and identify processes that may be altered. An
understanding of the causal factors could allow for the prevention of clinical worry
before it becomes problematic (Field et aI., 2008). Incorporating the role of parenting in
particular could contribute to such prevention or treatment.
This paper examines several areas of the literature in order to propose a model of
clinical worry in children and an initial empirical examination of portions of the model.
First, the influence of parenting on childhood anxiety disorders broadly is reviewed.
Conceptual models of the process and maintenance of worry in adults are then briefly
examined. Because no models of worry specific to children currently exist, adult models
will be discussed. Drawing from these two literatures, a model of worry in children is
proposed, integrating process and maintenance variables along with parental influences.
To address the impact of children's emerging cognitive abilities on proposed
associations, the influences of cognitive development on the model are also hypothesized.
Existing empirical support for the model is then reviewed followed by specific
hypotheses for the current study.
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1.

Parenting in Childhood Anxiety
Research has consistently shown that anxiety is familial (Schreier, Wittchen,

Hofler, & Lieb, 2008; Torgersen, 1983; Turner, Beidel, & Costello, 1987). Genetics play
an important role in the transmission of anxiety, and the genetic contribution explains
approximately one-third of the variance in child anxiety (Eley, 2001). A substantial
portion of variance remains unexplained by heritable characteristics, however, allowing
for the exploration of environmental factors such as parenting. Craske (1999) has
suggested that parenting contributes to child anxiety through both parenting styles
broadly and parenting behaviors more specifically. Interestingly, reviews of the influence
of parenting styles have not shown significant consistent relationships with child anxiety
(Wood et aI., 2003), and recent work has focused more specifically on parenting
behaviors. Although the bulk of this literature is not focused explicitly on worry, it
nonetheless informs our understanding of parental influences on children's anxiety across
a variety of anxiety symptoms. In addition, it is also important to consider if certain
aspects of parenting are uniquely related to childhood worry and this smaller literature
specific to worry will be reviewed later.
1.1 Parental behaviors
The relationship between parenting behaviors and childhood anxiety has received
significant attention in the literature over the last decade and several narrative reviews
and meta-analyses have consolidated results from a range of studies using various
methods and designs. Studies of parenting and child anxiety have mostly considered
dimensions of warmth and control and have used three methods for assessing parenting:
child report of parenting, parent report of parenting, and observation .. Wood et al. 's
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(2003) comprehensive review included studies of 1) parental control, defined as
excessive regulation of children's activities, parental decision making, overprotection,
and instructions on how to think and feel, and 2) parental acceptance, defined as parental
warmth, responsiveness, and involvement with children. Overall, results showed the
most consistent effects for parental control and mixed support for acceptance, with
stronger associations found in studies using an observational methodology. Fourteen
studies of parent control using child report of parental behavior and parent report of their
own parenting yielded inconclusive results. Six studies using observational methods,
however, showed that parents of anxious or shy children were more controlling and
granted less autonomy than parents of nonanxious children. Most (8 of 10) tests revealed
were significant and all but one effect size was considered medium or large. The majority
of tests from studies using child or parent report of parental acceptance also failed to
show significant associations with child anxiety, although five observational studies (8 of
18 tests) showed significant effects. Another review of work published after Wood et
al. 's review focused on parental control, defined as excessive regulation of children's
activities, vigilance and intrusion, and discouragement of independent problem solving,
and negativity, characterized by the absence of warmth and acceptance, criticism, and
rejection (Bogels & Brechman-Toussaint, 2006). The authors identified additional
observational studies supporting the relation between parental control and child anxiety,
but results from observational studies of parental warmth were inconsistent.
Due to the difficulty in quantifying results and effects using narrative reviews,
several meta-analyses have also examined relationships between parenting behaviors and
child anxiety. A meta-analysis of 47 studies found a medium effect size for the
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relationship between parental control and childhood anxiety (McLeod, Weisz, & Wood,
2007). The authors dismantled the construct of rejection, defined as low levels of warmth,
approval, and responsiveness, and the construct of control, defined as excessive
regulation, encouragement of dependence on parents, and instruction on how to think and
feel. Resulting subdimensions included warmth, withdrawal, aversiveness,
overinvolvement, and autonomy-granting. Results showed that autonomy-granting and
overinvolvement explained the greatest proportion of variance in childhood anxiety This
work underscores the importance of careful definition of constructs and examinations of
specific elements of parenting that may related differentially to child anxiety. However,
overall parental rejection and control explained only a small amount of variance in child
anxiety (4% and 6%, respectively), prompting the authors to suggest that perhaps
parenting plays a smaller role than many theories suggest. Another recent meta-analysis
of 17 observational studies further examined the relationship between parenting
constructs and child anxiety (van der Bruggen, Starns, & Bogels, 2008). They reported a
medium to large effect size for the association between parental control and child anxiety.
The authors also identified a number of moderator variables that resulted in larger effect
sizes, including child gender, child age, socioeconomic status, and type of interaction task
used to measure parenting. The authors conclude that their results do not support a direct
parent-to-child transmission of anxiety through parental behaviors, as parental control
was not strongly associated with parental anxiety.
1.2. Modeling of anxiety
Parental modeling of anxiety and fear related behaviors has also been identified as
a risk factor for the development of childhood anxiety. Although the hypothesis is
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commonly discussed in theoretical terms, the role of social learning in the transmission of
anxiety has received surprisingly little empirical attention. It stands to reason that
exposure to a parent's anxious behavior will influence children's interpretation of threat,
cognition about new or threatening situations, and preferred coping strategies.
Several methods have been used to examine parental modeling, including
behavioral tasks, naturalistic observation, and discussion based tasks. In one behavioral
study, researchers presented toddlers ages 15 to 20 months with a stimulus-maternal
reaction pair (Gerull & Rapee, 2002). Stimuli were two toys paired with either a
happy/encouraging maternal response or a fearful/disgusted maternal response. Children
showed greater avoidance behavior of the toy paired with the negative maternal reaction
and displayed more fearful affect after a negative maternal reaction trial. Children
continued to display the fear response one minute and ten minutes after the initial
modeling trial, suggesting that there is some lasting effect of exposure to parental
behaviors and affect.
Naturalistic observations of sequential parent-child behaviors also support the
modeling hypothesis. Mothers and their children ages 4 to 10 years were observed in the
waiting room of a pediatric clinic (Greenbaum et aI., 1988). Behaviors were coded for
maternal emotion, maternal problem focused behavior, and child distress. Using
sequential analysis, results showed that in dyads with high trait anxious mothers,
maternal agitation was more likely to precede child distress, a result not found for low
trait anxious mothers. In dyads with low trait anxious mothers child distress was more
likely to be followed by maternal agitation.
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Additional support for the importance of modeling comes from discussion based
studies hypothesizing that parental language models an anxious cognitive style for
children, increasing their risk for an anxiety disorder. In a study of mother-child
interactions, anxious mothers used more catastrophizing language with their anxiety
disordered children than nonanxious mothers (Whaley, Pinto, & Sigman, 1999). Another
study found that anxious mothers were more likely to catastrophize than nonanxious
mothers, regardless of the anxiety status of their children and for nonanxious mothers,
having an anxious child increased the likelihood of maternal catastrophizing
(Moore et aI., 2004). However, a more recent study failed to find differences between
anxious and nonanxious groups. Discussions between children 8 to 13 years, half of
whom met criteria for an anxiety disorder, and their parents were analyzed for verbal
content (Suveg et aI., 2008). Families were instructed to discuss times when the child felt
anxious, angry, and happy. Overall, results did not support thy hypothesis that parental
language was related to child anxiety. The only significant anxiety related difference
emerged for mothers with their sons, with nonanxious mothers engaging in more
explanatory discussion of emotion in anxious situations compared to anxious mothers.
1.3

Discussion

Despite a large body of work investigating the influence of parenting behavior on
child anxiety, unequivocal support has yet to emerge. Recent reviews and meta-analyses
suggest that perhaps parents playa less prominent role in their children's anxiety than
many theories would suggest (McLeod et aI., 2007). There may be several explanations
for these findings. First, methodological factors and sample characteristics may have not
have been fully considered in the analyses, as several studies have found support for
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these variables as moderators of the relation between parenting and child anxiety
(McLeod, et aI., 2007; van der Bruggen et aI., 2008). For example, several authors have
pointed out that when observational studies alone are considered, effects for parenting are
greater than when all study types are considered together. Second, specific definition and
measurement of parenting behaviors are needed. For example, although McLeod et ai.
(2007) found that parenting overall accounted for only 4% of the variance in childhood
anxiety, parental autonomy-granting specifically accounted for 18%. This suggests that
significant effects could be washed out by collapsing several types of behaviors into
larger categories.
Given the overall inconsistent findings and stated limitations, there are some
important findings to date. Parental control, and autonomy-granting in particular, shows
stronger and more consistent relationships with child anxiety compared to parental
warmth (Bogels & Brechman-Toussaint, 2006; McLeod, et aI., 2007; van der Bruggen, et
aI., 2008; Wood, et aI., 2003), suggesting that this is an important variable and worthy of
further consideration. It has been hypothesized (Chorpita & Barlow, 1998) that
controlling and intrusive parenting conveys negative messages to children about their
abilities. Children could interpret parental intrusiveness as an indicator that they do not
have adequate skills to cope. Alternatively, parental control could prevent children from
engaging in novel or challenging experiences where coping strategies might normally
develop.
More work is needed to fully understand the effects of parental modeling of
behavior and verbal modeling of cognitions. The few available studies of modeling
suggest that parent's negative behavior or negative verbalizations may be copied by
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children. Although intriguing, these data need to be replicated and theoretical models for
the impact of modeling on child anxiety specifically developed and tested. These results
could have important implications for children of anxious parents who may deliver
negative information or model negative and/or avoidant cognitions about novel
experiences more frequently than nonanxious parents. Repeated exposure to parental
anxious behavior could contribute to stable attributions and beliefs in children. The
literature to date, however, on the effect of parental verbalization on children's anxiety is
limited.
Finally, several issues must be considered when interpreting this work. First, the
bidirectional nature of parent-child interactions cannot be ignored. Children undoubtedly
influence their parent's behavior and affect, eliciting certain responses. The contributions
of both members of the dyad will better inform our current understanding of the role of
parents. Second, the design of future studies should give more consideration to potential
moderators, such as parent and child gender, child developmental stage, and child
temperament. As discussed, these factors could alter relationships between variables, and
if not considered, mask potential effects. In addition, the influence of fathers on
children's psychological well-being has been largely ignored. Understanding parental
influences on children should include the unique contributions of both mother and father.
Effects may differ for mothers and fathers, and the inclusion of both parent and child sex
would provide a more comprehensive understanding of these relationships. Finally, most
studies have included only traditional nuclear families. Many children today split their
time between several households that include stepparents, stepsiblings, and half -siblings.
Understanding the influence of parenting in environments when mothers and fathers are
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not living together and when stepparents are involved in child rearing would be beneficial
in understanding the modem parent-child dynamic.

2.

Adult models of GAD
Worry and GAD in adults have received increasing attention over the last 15

years. Worry has been conceptualized as a largely cognitive process. As such, most
research, though not all, has emphasized the role of cognitive and metacognitive factors
in worry and several theoretical models have been proposed. These models have been
well supported empirically and in some cases have led to the development of specific
interventions (see Behar et aI., 2009 for a review). Although the child literature lags well
behind the adult literature in this area, researchers are beginning to examine the role of
cognitive factors and cognitive development in adolescent worry. By and large, however,
the models remain untested in school age children. The next section reviews the
empirically supported adult models of GAD and worry, with findings relevant to
adolescents or children included when available.
2.1 Avoidance model
Borkovec's (1994) avoidance model was one of the earliest conceptualizations of
worry. He defined worry as a verbal stream of uncontrollable, negative thoughts directed
toward potential future threats. At the heart of Borkovec's model is the notion that worry
functions as a form of avoidance. Individuals with GAD report that worry helps to avoid
threat by making future negative events less likely or by preventing such events entirely
(Borkovec, 1994). Because the likelihood of most feared events is relatively small to
begin with, these beliefs about worry are negatively reinforced. Individuals with GAD
also report that they use worry as a method of distraction and for avoiding deeper, more

11

emotionally laden content or threat (Borkovec, 1994). Physiological studies provide
additional support for patients' report that worry serves as avoidance. Work in this area
has documented a restricted range of physiological activity associated with worry
described as autonomic inflexibility, or a lower range of variability in physiological
responses (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Lyonfields, Borkovec, & Thayer, 1995; Thayer,
Friedman, & Borkovec, 1996). Borkovec and colleagues (1998) suggest that it is the
predominantly verbal nature of worry that results in reduced vagal activity, as verbal
thoughts elicit lower cardiovascular response than images of the same content. The
suppression of autonomic responses has important implications for the maintenance of
worry. If worrying inhibits physiological response, habituation to feared stimuli cannot
be achieved (Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993), suggesting that worry works in much the
same way as other avoidance strategies, preventing exposure and perpetuating anxious
meanings (Borkovec, 1994).
2.2. Beliefs about worry and metaworry
Several models have posited that metacognition plays a fundamental role in
development and maintenance of clinical worry. Wells (1995) emphasized the
importance of metacognitive beliefs about both the process and content of worry. His
model includes positive metabeliefs about the usefulness of worry, negative metabeliefs
about the dangers of and uncontrollability of worry, and metaworry. He proposes that
positive metabeliefs lead to Type 1 worry, or content based worries about events. This
worry then becomes intrusive and bothersome, activating negative beliefs about the
danger of worry, which in tum lead to metaworry, or Type 2 worry. Metaworry is
reinforced by related changes in behavior, attempts to control the worry, and negative
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emotion. He suggests that worry becomes problematic when metaworry develops, leading
to perseveration and attempts to control the worry. An empirical examination of the
model largely supported the hypotheses, showing that when both worry types and trait
anxiety were used to predict worry or ratings of worry interference, trait anxiety and
Type 2 worry emerged as significant predictors (Wells & Carter, 1999).
Other researchers have focused on positive and negative beliefs about worry.
Freeston et aI. (Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, & Dugas, 1994) developed a measure, the
Why Worry? scale, to examine reasons people worry. Results revealed two factors,
consisting of 1) beliefs that worry helps to facilitate cognitive avoidance, reduces the
chance of negative outcomes, and reduces the consequence of negative outcomes, and 2)
beliefs that worry helps to increase control and facilitate problem solving. Another study
(Davey, Tallis, & Capuzzo, 1996) of beliefs about worry found two higher order factors
of positive consequences, including two first order factors of "worry motivates" and
"worry helps analytic thinking," and negative consequences, including three first order
factors of "worrying disrupts effective performance," "worrying exaggerates the
problem," and "worrying causes emotional discomfort." They also found that individuals
who scored high on both the positive and negative consequences scales reported higher
levels of worry and depression, more worry domains, poorer general health, and more
negative automatic thoughts than those who scored lower on one or both scales. Beliefs
about worry have also been shown to discriminate clinical from normal levels of worry
(Freeston et aI., 1994).
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2.3 Intolerance of uncertainty
Intolerance of uncertainty (ill) is another cognitive variable that has been linked
with worry in adults. Intolerance of uncertainty is defined as a negative response,
including emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions, to situations or events
interpreted as ambiguous (Buhr & Dugas, 2006). More specifically, intolerance of
uncertainty reflects a set of beliefs that uncertainty is stressful, upsetting, interferes with
functioning, and that being uncertain about the future is unfair (Buhr & Dugas, 2002).
Intolerance of uncertainty has been shown to discriminate participants who, based on
self-report, met full criteria for GAD, met the somatic criteria only, and met no GAD
criteria (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). Intolerance of uncertainty also appears to have a unique
relationship with worry. In a study with undergraduate students, Buhr and Dugas (2006)
found that intolerance of uncertainty remained positively correlated with worry even after
controlling for intolerance of ambiguity, perfectionism, and perceived control. This study
also showed that intolerance of uncertainty explained additional variance in worry scores
above and beyond demographics and other study variables.
2.4. Problem solving and problem orientation
In addition to work on metacognition and worry, others have examined relations
between problem solving and worry. Davey (1994) defines worry as a continuous,
unsuccessful attempt to solve a problem. Worry is associated with the informationseeking coping strategy of monitoring, characterized as vigilance for potential threatrelated information (Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992). Davey (1994)
suggests that a monitoring style of problem solving is particularly problematic when the
threat is uncontrollable, and consistent monitoring likely contributes to worry
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maintenance when the problem is not easily solvable. Early hypotheses suggested that
worriers lacked adequate problem solving skills; however, later work found that worry
was related to poor problem-solving confidence and lower perceived control over the
problem solving process, but there was no relation with problem-solving effectiveness
(Davey, 1994). Another study showed that participants who received poor feedback about
their problem solving solutions (regardless of their true performance) reported lower
problem solving confidence, which in tum was associated with more catastrophizing
steps during a worry interview (Davey, Jubb, & Cameron, 1996). Based on these
findings, the relation between worry and problem solving has less to do with actual skill
set and more to do with beliefs and attributions about one's competence and ability to
cope with problems when they arise.
Problem orientation, a closely related construct, also shows strong associations
with clinical worry in adults. Ladouceur and colleagues (1998) define problem
orientation as an individual's set of potential responses when confronted with a problem,
as well as the metacognitive activity that characterizes an individual's approach to
dealing with problems. One study found that nonclinical moderate worriers, nonclinical
subjects meeting GAD symptom criteria by questionnaire, and GAD patients showed no
difference in problem solving skills; however, the two GAD groups reported poorer
problem orientation than the moderate worrier group (Ladouceur et aI., 1998). Building
on these results, Robichaud and Dugas (2005) investigatedworry and depression relation
specifically to negative problem orientation, defined as beliefs about threat of problems
to well-being, doubt about problem solving ability, and pessimism about the problem
resolution. After controlling for pessimism, self-mastery, and neuroticism, negative
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problem orientation predicted more variance in worry than depression and discriminated
between high and low worriers. Another study included subdimensions of problem
orientation, including emotional, cognitive, and behavioral orientation and found that of
the three, only emotional problem orientation predicted worry (Dugas, Freeston, &
Ladouceur, 1997).
2.5 Information processing
Another cognitive variable, information processing, has also been linked with
worry in adults. Models of worry in adults have emphasized the importance of
information processing, suggesting that it serves as a causal and/or maintaining factor in
GAD. This work has used several different paradigms, and overall results suggest that
GAD is associated with attentional bias and the tendency to interpret ambiguous
information as threatening. Results from dot-probe tasks indicate that those with GAD
show a bias toward threat compared to nonanxious controls, as indicated by faster
reaction times to dots replaced by threatening versus non-threatening material (MacLeod,
Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mathews, 1990; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). Work using a
lexical decision making task, in which participants are presented with individual letters
and asked whether the letters form a word, also support the finding of a bias toward threat
in those with GAD (MacLeod & Mathews, 1991; Mogg, Mathews, Eysenck, & May,
1991) Results from studies using the Stroop task, in which threat and neutral words are
presented in different colors and subjects are asked to name the colors while ignoring
content, found that those with GAD are slower than nonanxious controls to name threat
words (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989). Attentional
interference is thought to occur due to word content, resulting in errors and longer
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response times. This work is not unequivocal, however, as at least one study failed to find
differences in attentional bias associated with GAD (Dibartolo, Brown, & Barlow, 1997).
Individuals with GAD are also more likely than nonanxious individuals to
interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening. When presented with ambiguous scenarios,
GAD participants described more threatening interpretations and rated the events as more
likely to occur compared to nonanxious individuals (Butler & Mathews, 1983). A later
study found similar results using homophones, with GAD participants reporting more
threatening meanings (e.g., die rather than dye) than nonanxious participants (Mathews,
Richards, & Eysenck, 1989).
2.6. Integrated models
Several cognitive variables have been studied in relation to worry, and the
importance of avoidance, intolerance of uncertainty, beliefs about worry, and information
processing in the process of worry in adults has been established. However, most models
to date have focused on the association of only one ofthese variables with worry. The
few studies that have incorporated multiple variables have increased our understanding of
how these variables influence one another and their relative contributions to worry.
It is likely that the cognitive variables associated with worry are also related to

one another. In particular, information processing, intolerance of uncertainty and problem
orientation seem very closely related. Given that uncertainty is both distressing and
interpreted as threatening, problem orientation and information processing are almost
certainly also affected. A negative problem orientation might also lead to difficulty
defining problems in concrete or specific terms, increasing the perception of ambiguity in
everyday life. This could in tum present difficulty for individuals likely to interpret threat
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from ambiguous stimuli and for those with a high level of intolerance of uncertainty.
Dugas and colleagues (1997) were the first to examine the relations between
intolerance of uncertainty and negative problem orientation in a sample of GAD patients.
A hierarchical regression showed that the constructs made both unique and shared
contributions to the prediction of worry. These results suggest that, although the two are
highly related to one another, they also have individual associations with worry. Dugas et
al. (2005) also investigated how intolerance of uncertainty affects information processing.
When presented with neutral and uncertain words, undergraduate students high in
intolerance of uncertainty recalled a greater proportion of words associated with
uncertainty. A second study of undergraduates showed that individuals high in
intolerance of uncertainty were more likely to interpret ambiguous information as
threatening. Further, intolerance of uncertainty predicted threat interpretation above and
beyond age, gender, anxiety, depression, and worry.
Given the importance of intolerance of uncertainty to worry, Dugas et al.
proposed that intolerance of uncertainty is the central feature of worry (Dugas, Gagnon,
Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998). The model suggests that beliefs about worry, problem
orientation, problem solving skills, and cognitive avoidance are also important to
consider. Discriminant analyses found that all variables except problem solving skills
contributed to the correct classification of GAD and nonanxious participants and
intolerance of uncertainty played the strongest role in the classification. A second
discriminant analysis approach comparing the utility of the cognitive variables to GAD
symptoms in group classification found that cognitive variables correctly classified
almost as many participants as the symptom measures (82% and 91 % respectively).
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Cognitive variables also appear to be associated with clinical severity. A study of
intolerance of uncertainty and beliefs about worry found that each factor varied according
to symptom severity (Ladouceur et aI., 1998). Results showed that both nonclinical
subjects meeting GAD symptom criteria by questionnaire and GAD patients reported
higher intolerance of uncertainty and more dysfunctional beliefs about the usefulness of
worry compared to moderate worriers. Work by Ruscio and Borkovec (2004) examined
several differences between high worriers with and without a GAD diagnosis. The groups
showed several similarities, with both groups demonstrating difficulties with
concentration, high levels of positive beliefs about worry, and an increased awareness of
thoughts. However, negative beliefs about worry appeared to be unique to high worriers
with GAD, and GAD worriers experienced more negative intrusions after a worry
induction task. A later study by Dugas and colleagues showed that several cognitive
variables were related to GAD severity in a clinical sample (Dugas et aI., 2007).
Intolerance of uncertainty and negative problem orientation correlated with three
measures of GAD severity, cognitive avoidance correlated with two measures of GAD
severity, and positive beliefs correlated with one measure of GAD severity. Moderate and
severe GAD groups also reported higher intolerance of uncertainty and negative problem
orientation compared to the mild GAD group. Overall, results of these studies are
consistent, suggesting that intolerance of uncertainty is the most robust predictor of GAD
severity.
2.7 Discussion
Several conceptual models of worry in adults have been proposed. Some
emphasize the importance of the avoidant functions of worry, while others highlight the
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importance of beliefs about worry and metacognition. Others have investigated the roles
of intolerance of uncertainty, problem orientation, and information processing. Some
studies have examined these factors alone while others have looked at interrelationships
between them and their relative contributions to worry. Given that each conceptual model
reviewed has empirical support, the time has come to incorporate these constructs and
ideas into a more comprehensive model. Dugas' group has taken importantsteps toward
this endeavor (Dugas et aI., 1997; Dugas et aI., 1998), including several cognitive
variables in their designs to determine unique and shared contributions of the variables to
worry.
There is still some conceptual confusion in understanding differences in various
types of worry. Studies to date have investigated nonclinical worry, excessive but not
clinical worry, worry in disorders other than GAD, and worry in GAD, but it is still not
clear how these presentations of worry differ from one another in terms of the cognitive
variables discussed. Understanding how worry differs in these groups has important
implications for conceptualization and treatment. Identifying variables unique to clinical
worry can inform our understanding of distress and interference associated and provide
better targets for intervention.

3.

Worry in children
3.1 GAD diagnostic criteria
The GAD diagnosis in children is still somewhat controversial in the literature

today. This is due in part to its somewhat recent addition to the DSM-IV-TR (American
Psychiatric Association, 2004), replacing the previous diagnosis of Overanxious Disorder
(OAD). The current diagnosis requires excessive worry about a number of events, more
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days than not for a period longer than six months. Children must also report that the
worry is uncontrollable and list one or more somatic complaints, such as restlessness,
fatigue, difficulty concentrating, irritability, muscle tension, or sleep disturbance.
Studies investigating the reliability, validity, and factor structure of the present
GAD diagnosis in children have found mixed results. Two studies have documented
discrepancies in parent and child report of child symptoms (Kendall & Pimental, 2003;
Tracey, Chorpita, Douban, & Barlow, 1997). Parent-child agreement was low for all
symptoms and, for one-fourth of the children diagnosed with GAD, either parent or child
reported no clinical worry at all (Tracey et aI., 1997). The physical symptoms criterion
(Criterion C) is especially problematic, and Tracey et aI., (1997) found that parent-child
agreement improved when this requirement was ignored. The muscle tension item in
particular shows low clinical utility. Muscle tension was endorsed less frequently than
any other symptom in Criterion C by both parents and children, in contrast to the high
level of endorsement by adults with GAD (Tracey et aI., 1997). Later work confirmed the
problems with Criterion C, with parents and children failing to agree on symptoms 4866% of the time (Kendall & Pimentel, 2003). Parents also reported significantly more
physical symptoms than children. A recent factor analysis found that GAD symptoms in
children factored into a worry factor and a somatic distress factor, and the somatic
distress factor correlated similarly with social anxiety, major depressive disorder, and
worry (Higa-McMillan, Smith, Chorpita, & Hayashi, 2008), casting additional doubt on
the utility of somatic symptoms for diagnosing GAD in children.
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3.2 Content of worry
Within the literature on childhood worry, issues related to worry content have
been examined most frequently. In community samples of children ages 7 to 13 years, the
most common worries include health (e.g., other people's health, operations, receiving
medical care, bodily symptoms, contracting AIDS, or getting sick), school (e.g., tests and
grades, being called on, and interacting with the teacher) personal harm (e.g., injury from
other people and being attacked), and social contact (e.g., being teased and getting
friends) (Muris et aI., 2000; Silverman, La Greca, & Wasserstein, 1995). Work with
clinic referred and community based samples of children ages 6 to 16 years showed
similar worries across groups, including concerns about health, school, disasters, and
personal harm (Weems, Silverman, & La Greca, 2000). Comparisons of children
diagnosed with GAD/OAD and specific phobia showed that the two groups reported only
slight differences, with GAD children endorsing more worry about the future and social
concerns while children with specific phobia reported more worry related to health of
others and family (Weems, Silverman, & La Greca, 2000). Results also suggest that
intensity of worry, not content, discriminates the worry of clinical children from that of
community children, and GAD/OAD children from specific phobia children.
3.3 Developmental considerations
3.3.1 Cognitive development implications for worry
Although both the cognitive development and child anxiety literatures are well
developed, works bridging the two are uncommon. Mapping emerging cognitive abilities
onto the expression of anxiety related symptoms would greatly improve our
understanding of the underlying processes involved in worry in children, shed light on
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symptom expression, and potentially explain developmental trends in anxiety prevalence
and content. Such an understanding could also inform intervention strategies, ensuring
that cognitive techniques to alleviate worry are applicable given the child's level of
cognitive development. For example, techniques used effectively with adults, such as
monitoring anxious thoughts, may not be appropriate for young children who lack
awareness of their thoughts. Two related issues are relevant to children's cognitive
development and worry, and both will be explored. First, the question of how child
development influences the prevalence, expression, and experience of worry will be
addressed, and second, the implications of cognitive development for adult models of
worry and GAD will be discussed.
The prevalence of worry and GAD symptoms in children increases with age,
suggesting that the development of cognitive skills facilitates worry. In a study of
symptoms in clinically referred children ages 5 to 11 years and adolescents ages 12 to 19
years, results showed older children were more likely to present with six or more
symptoms compared to younger children (66% and 35%), and more older children met all
seven OAD diagnostic criteria than younger children (28% and 4%) (Strauss, Lease, Last,
& Francis, 1988). One longitudinal study of community adolescents found that from

early adolescence (average age of 12 years) to middle adolescence (average age of 16.6
years), GAD symptoms increased for girls and decreased for boys (Hale, Raaijmakers,
Muris, van Hoof, & Meeus, 2008). Another study examined developmental changes in
fears, nightmares, and worry in a group of school children (Muris, Merckelbach, Gadet,
& Moulaert, 2000). Fears and nightmares were common in the youngest children ages 4

to 6 and increased in children ages 7 to 9. Fears and nightmares were least common in the
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10 to 12-year-olds. Worry, however, was more common in the two older groups (47%
compared to nearly 80%). Westenberg and colleagues have shown associations between
psychosocial development and separation anxiety and OAD. Psychosocial development
was defined as ego development consisting of three related facets of impulse control,
interpersonal style, and conscious preoccupations. The authors show that psychosocial
development was a stronger predictor than child age in correctly classifying children into
separation anxiety disorder and OAD diagnostic groups (Westenberg, Siebelink,
Warmenhoven, & Treffers, 1999).
In addition to changes in worry prevalence with age, there is also evidence for

developmental patterns associated with worry content. One study found that in younger
children aged 3 to 6 years, the most frequent worry involved fear of imaginary creatures,
a very uncommon concern in older children ages 7 to 14 years (Muris et aI., 2002). Older
children in this study worried more about school performance, a fear that increased
steadily with child age. Other studies with children ages 5 to 12 years have found similar
developmental patterns, with younger children describing more concern over threats to
physical safety, which declines with age, and older children describing worries about
behavioral competence, interpersonal and social issues, and psychological well-being,
which generally increases with age (Muris et aI., 2002; Vasey, Crnic, & Carter, 1994).
However, results have not been entirely consistent. For example, in the previously
discussed study, Vasey et aI. (1994) failed to find increased worry about behavior
competence in the 11 to 12-year-old children compared to 8t09-year-olds. In another
study of a community sample of children ages 7 to 12 years, Silverman, La Greca, and
Wasserstein (1995) found only that younger children experienced more intense worry
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about disasters than older children. Other evidence for developmental trends in worry
comes from a study of the nature of worry across child age. In a non-referred group of
children ages 8 to 13 years, older children's worry was characterized by more problem
solving and less rumination compared to younger children (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004).
One way to understand these developmental trends might be to identify precisely
what skills and abilities are necessary to worry and to then relate these abilities to typical
cognitive development. A focus on the most widely accepted definition of worry
proposed by Borkovec (1994) provides a useful guide. Borkovec suggests that worry is a
future oriented, primarily verbal stream of negatively valenced and threatening thoughts
that are relatively uncontrollable. Several skills and abilities are required to engage in
such a process. As Vasey (1993) points out, individuals must be able to conceptualize the
future, elaborate on threatening thoughts, and possess language abilities adequate to
represent threatening information. Also implied by this definition is an awareness of
one's internal stream of consciousness and the experience that the thoughts are out of
one's control.
Borkovec's (1994) definition implies that worry requires a fairly advanced
conceptualization of the future. Vasey (1993) suggests that very young children's
restricted ability to think about the future limits their ability to worry in a generalized
way. For example, Povinelli, Landau, and Perilloux (1996) concluded that children
younger than age four are unable to view themselves as an entity moving through time
and cannot integrate past, present, and future versions of the self. Vasey (1993) proposes
that even a vague notion of the near future, like that seen in children as young as 2 years
old (Littenberg, Tulkin, & Kagan, 1971), may be sufficient for worry. However, the
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increase in ability to understand the future seen in children around age 8 years (Wallace
& Rabin, 1960) likely results in an ability to experience truly generalized worry.

Children's increasing ability to extend their understanding of the future further in time
may provide more opportunities to consider potentially threatening situations, while
younger children's narrow temporal understanding limits the possibility of threat (Vasey,
1993).
Worry also requires the production of a chain of negative thoughts depicting
various threatening outcomes. Vasey (1993) has summarized work indicating that
children's abilities to generate and reason about possible outcomes increases with child
age. The cognitive literature also suggests that although young children have a basic
ability to reason about causal events and consider alternative outcomes, this ability
increases with age. For example, Flavell, Green, and Flavell (2004) reviewed work
indicating that children as young as age three years can infer causal relationships in
complicated conditions, and counterfactual reasoning, which involves making predictions
about what could have happened but didn't, has been documented in children as young as
three years (Harris, German, & Mills, 1996). Another important point related to worry
was raised by German (1999), who suggested that counterfactual reasoning is more likely
to occur in response to negative events than positive ones, so that children imagine what
other possible courses of action could have prevented the undesirable outcome.
Reflecting on past events and imagining how things might have gone under different
circumstances suggests an ability to generate and understand the possibility of multiple
outcomes, which may then lead to a consideration of future possible negative events. For
example, in the study discussed above, (Harris et aI., 1996) children were presented with
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a story about Carol who wore muddy shoes in the house and got the floor dirty. When
asked what would have happened if Carol had taken her shoes off, most children
correctly responded that the floor would have remained clean. An ability to ask past
"what ifs?" might also indicate an ability to generate future "what ifs?" If children were
to reason similarly in their own lives, a reflection such as "If I remembered to take off my
shoes last time I wouldn't have gotten in trouble" could lead to a reflections such as
"What if I forget to take off my shoes next time?" In fact, others have argued that
reasoning about future hypothetical situations may actually be easier than past
hypothetical situations because children do not have to mentally "undo" actions or
imagine contrary to their reality (Robinson, Beck, Mitchell, & Riggs, 2000). Other work
(Lagattuta, 2007) suggests that young children draw from past experiences to explain or
predict hypothetical future emotions and behavior. When discussing the future in
response to vignettes, most 4-year-old children and all 5 and 6-year-old children were
able to make at least one "definite past to future" connection, indicating that the future is
definite. Further, 63% of 4-year-olds and 75% of 6-year-olds made at least one
"hypothetical past to future" connection, suggesting that the future is hypothetical.
Adult models of worry presuppose an awareness of internal verbal thoughts.
However, cognitive work suggests that children's awareness of their internal stream of
consciousness and that of others varies as a function of cognitive development. For
example, when asked if a person sitting in a chair and waiting was having thoughts, most
3 and 4-year-old children responded that the person was having no thoughts or ideas
(15% and 35%, respectively) while 80% of 6 and 7-year-olds reported that the waiting
individual was in fact having thoughts (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1993). Another study
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showed that young children are not aware that others must be having thoughts when
doing mental activities, such as reading or talking (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995).
Flavell, Green, and Flavell (2000) found that at age 5 years children were able to report
previous thoughts when instructed to imagine themselves doing something they enjoy;
however, when instructed to have "no thoughts" children could not report their
spontaneous ideation, denying having any thoughts at all during this time. Relatedly,
Flavell, Green, Flavell, and Grossman (1997) found that 4 and 5-year-old children were
significantly worse than adults at detecting inner speech, leading the authors conclude
that preschool children have very little awareness of covert verbal thought. They suggest
that this ability may develop in the early school years when children begin practicing
inner speech in academic tasks, such as reading and writing.
Current definitions of worry also suggest that clinical worry is uncontrollable.
However, children's awareness that thoughts are not entirely under their power may still
be emerging in early childhood. Flavell, Green, and Flavell (1998) found that young
children had little understanding that the mind's activity is somewhat uncontrollable.
When presented with stories depicting children attempting to avoid specific thoughts
(thoughts of an injection or the cause of a loud noise), 5-year-old children were more
likely than older children (9 and 13-year-olds) or adults to report that children in the
stories could control their thoughts and successfully avoid thinking about the injection or
the loud noise. Surprisingly, more than half of the 9-year-old sample also incorrectly
indicated (for at least one story) that children in the story could control their thoughts.
Five-year-old children were also more likely than the two older groups to report that it is
possible to avoid having any thoughts at all for three consecutive days. Finally, only half
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of 5-year-olds reported experiencing unwanted thoughts compared to 95% of the 9-yearolds. Overall, results suggest that most development in metacognition occurs between the
ages of 5 and 9 years, although 9-year-olds still lag behind 13-year-olds. These findings
have important implications for the current diagnostic criteria for GAD in children which
require that the worry is experienced as uncontrollable. The abilities of children younger
than 9 years to determine the controllability of their thoughts may still be developing,
preventing accurate report of worry controllability and possibly preventing a GAD
diagnosis that may otherwise be appropriate.
Another related cognitive ability in children relates to children's use of mental
representation of information, which may affec:t the expression or experience of worry.
Borkovec's (1994) definition describes worry as primarily verbal stream of negative
thoughts, and so the ability to capture meaning verbally is crucial for worry. Whether
young children with less developed verbal skills worry in the way that Borkovec
describes is not known. Vasey (1993) has described work indicating that young children
rely on visual images and motor schemes in understanding and storing information about
the world, and Szabo (2007) found that while adults' worries were closely related to the
extent to which they think about their worries, children's worries were related more
strongly to fear than to a verbal thinking process. Perhaps children's limited language
skills protect them from adult-like worry or, alternatively, they may worry in a more
simplistic way, using the verbal skills available at any given point in time.
Current definitions of worry also suggest that worry serves an avoidant function.
Children's cognitive and language development may directly influence the extent to
which worry results in avoidance of more distressing material. Borkovec (1994) has
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suggested that it is worry's primarily verbal nature that allows for emotional avoidance,
and such avoidance is thought to be a powerful maintaining factor in the worry process. It
is not currently understood if children's worry is associated with a perception of
avoidance or the autonomic inflexibility seen in worried adults.
Finally, metacognitive models of worry imply a number of cognitive abilities that
vary with cognitive development. . Several models rest on an individual's ability to form
relatively complex thoughts and judgments about both internal and external stimuli. The
metacognitive model, if applied to children, assumes that children have the ability to
reflect on their own worry and form opinions about its usefulness and threat to wellbeing.
Models including intolerance of uncertainty assume the ability to recognize a situation as
uncertain and evaluate its potential for threat, as well as the capacity to develop a set of
negative beliefs about uncertainty. Problem orientation, described as metacognitive
activity that characterizes an individual's approach to dealing with problems, also implies
abilities to recognize and evaluate mental problem solving skills and outcomes. Work
reviewed previously (Flavell et aI., 1993; 1995; 2000) indicates that children may be
unaware of or have difficulty identifying their own thoughts, suggesting that
metacognitive models may have limited utility in young children (especially those
younger than school age). With increasing cognitive abilities and metacognition capacity,
these models are likely to become more accurate in explaining children's experience of
worry. More work is needed in this area to fully understand the cognitive abilities
underlying the worry process and at what age or developmental stage we would expect
cognitive models to apply to children.
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3.3.2 Empirical studies of cognitive development and worry
Few empirical studies have examined relations between cognitive development
and worry, but results are generally consistent and show the predicted increase in worry
with age and/or development. Vasey, Crnic, and Carter (1994) examined relations
between cognitive development, self-concept complexity, and worry in a community
sample of children ages 5 to 12 years. In response to a series of vignettes depicting
worried children, older children (8 to 12 years) described more worries, a greater variety
of worries, and longer worry elaboration chains than those of the 5 to 6- year- old
children. The authors note that children as young as 5 years reported worries and were
able to elaborate on them, although not to the extent of the older children. Results also
showed positive correlations between self-concept complexity and proportion of physical
threat and social evaluation/psychological worries. Muris et al. (2002) found similar
results in their study of a community sample of children ages 3 to 14 years old. Personal
worry and vignette worry elaboration scores correlated positively with child age and
cognitive development, as measured by Piagetian conservation tasks. Interestingly, even
the youngest group of children (ages 3 to 6 years) reported a significant amount of worry.
Worry elaboration also mediated the association between age/cognitive development and
personal worry. Another study comparing cognitive development (measured with one
conservation task) and worry across samples of children with average and below average
intelligence found that average children reported more worry and fear compared to
children with below average intelligence, but there were no differences in worry content
or severity (Muris, Merckelbach, & Luijten, 2002). For average children, passing the
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conservation task was associated with an increased likelihood of worry, but no such
relation was found for the children with below average intelligence.
3.3.3 Discussion
Considering children's cognitive capacity and the influence of emerging skills on
the experience of worry is important for the development of testable models of worry in
children. Generally, as Vasey (1993) concludes, young children seem to possess basic
forms of the abilities needed for some form of worry, including a notion of the future, an
ability to generate at least one negative outcome, and the ability to produce counterfactual
"what if' statements. Perhaps these basic abilities are adequate for some form of worry,
albeit different from that experienced by adults, but they are likely unable to experience
generalized worry due to the still developing ability to recognize internal streams of
consciousness or to recognize that their thoughts are at times uncontrollable or
spontaneous. As these skills develop, however, children's basic worry may elaborate as
they are able to consider a greater number of negative events extending more distantly
into the future. Metacognitive awareness of internal verbal thoughts and their
uncontrollable nature also allows children to interpret meaning from their internal
experience. If children find the worried, uncontrollable thoughts threatening, this may
lead to a type of metaworry as described by Wells (1999). Future work measuring
relevant cognitive abilities, worry, and worry related variables (such as beliefs about
worry and intolerance of uncertainty) will help to identify weaknesses or inaccuracies in
applying current adult models of worry to children. Such work would also be beneficial
in determining at what age or cognitive ability adult models become applicable to
children. This in tum could be used to guide future treatment interventions.

32

4.

A model of worry in children
The adult worry literature is far more advanced than the child literature. Because

so little is known about worry in children, these adult models provide a basis for
suggesting hypotheses that can then be tested. The model proposed here integrates
several models of worry supported in the adult literature and also accounts for the
influence of parenting, an important factor in the development of childhood anxiety.
Before describing the model, several issues must be addressed. First, because of the lack
of literature on childhood GAD and worry, many elements of the model are speculative at
this point. The adult literature indicates that the elements are important for worry in
adults; therefore, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that they also operate in children.
Second, how the worry process unfolds is still unknown. No adult studies have
investigated whether processing of information occurs first, followed by the activation of
beliefs about worry or an attempt to problem solve. It is unclear how these processes
occur, whether sequentially or in concert. The proposed model hypothesizes only that
some variables are more likely linked with the onset of worry while others serve as
maintaining factors.
The model begins with a potentially ambiguous trigger (Mathews (1990) has
suggested that many everyday cues for danger are ambiguous), and details the
contributions of the process variables of (a) intolerance of uncertainty, (b) information
processing, (c) problem orientation, and (d) beliefs about worry (See Figure 1). First, the
model suggests that intolerance of uncertainty, information processing and problem
orientation are closely interrelated and predictive of worry. Previous work indicates that
those high in intolerance of uncertainty find ambiguous situations distressing and have
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difficulty functioning in them (Buhr & Dugas, 2006). Ambiguity is also associated with
information processing patterns characterized by attentional bias toward threat and
elevated threat interpretation, suggesting that intolerance of uncertainty may be related to
the threatening meanings interpreted from ambiguity. When confronted with an
ambiguous, threatening stimulus, it follows then that problem orientation suffers.
Individuals may feel overwhelmed or less confident when presented with ambiguous
information, hindering effective problem solving. Worry may provide the illusion of
problem solving but without any decision making or plan of action (Borkovec, 1985).
The fourth process variable in the model is beliefs about worry, both positive and
negative. Positive beliefs such as "worrying helps me cope" and "worry prevents bad
things from happening" may make worry an attractive coping strategy for handling
threat. Both positive and negative beliefs about worry have been linked with worry and
trait anxiety (Davey, Tallis, & Capuzzo, 1996). Negative beliefs that worry is harmful or
dangerous may contribute to increased worry by leading to attempts to monitor, control,
or suppress worry. These strategies, however, are likely increase rather than decrease
intrusive worries. Whether negative beliefs are best conceptualized as a factor associated
with the onset of worry or one more closely linked with the maintenance of worry over
time remains an empirical question. Before teasing apart more specific relations,
however, it should first be determined if there is in fact an association between negative
beliefs and worry in children.
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Figure 1. Hypothesized conceptual model of relevant process and maintenance variables
in childhood worry.

The model also illustrates how worry is maintained by positive and negative
beliefs and cognitive avoidance. First, worry reinforces positive beliefs about worry
because of the perception that worry helps to avoid threat. Borkovec (1994) suggests that
worriers believe worry (1) helps them to avoid potential danger by prompting a change in
behavior, (2) preparing them to cope with potential future danger, and (3) reinforcing
irrational beliefs that worry reduces the likelihood of danger. For instance, a person who
thinks "I shouldn't drive after dark because 1 might get in an accident" is prompted to
avoid driving after dark because she believes it is dangerous. This change in behavior is
reinforced because the person believes that worry helped to avoid a potentially dangerous
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situation. Beliefs about coping are reinforced because the worrier expects that, should a
catastrophe occur, she will be more prepared than she would have if she hadn't worried
beforehand. A worrier's superstitious belief that worrying prevents feared events is
negatively reinforced by its non-occurrence. Secondly, negative beliefs about worry
(including metaworry) maintain the process by increasing the likelihood of future
worries. Beliefs that worry is dangerous or should be controlled will result in increased
metacognitive awareness, prompting additional attempts to suppress or control worry.
Paradoxically, such suppression attempts are likely to be associated with an increase in
subsequent intrusive worries. Third, worry is maintained because it serves an avoidant
function. Worry is conceptualized as a form of cognitive avoidance due to the primarily
verbal nature of worry and reduction in fear provoking imagery (Borkovec & Lyonfields,
1993) as well as reduced processing of more emotional content (Borkovec & Inz, 1990;
Borkovec & Roemer, 1995). This has been associated in tum with decreases in
physiological responses, suggesting that worry results in avoidance of uncomfortable
physiological symptoms as well (Borkovec & Hu, 1990).
Finally, the potentially causal influence of parenting on the process and
maintenance of worry is hypothesized. Parents are expected to influence their children's
beliefs about worry, both positive and negative. Further, it is predicted that parents will
influence their children's approach to making sense of ambiguous information by
impacting the child's problem orientation, intolerance of uncertainty, and information
processing.
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s.

Support for hypothesized model

Support for the hypothesized model is reviewed in three parts. First, support for
the model detailing the process and maintenance of worry in children will be reviewed.
Second, evidence for the direct association between parenting and worry will be
reviewed, followed by evidence for specific links between parenting and process and
maintenance variables.
5.1

Process and maintenance variables in childhood worry

Work detailing associations between cognitive variables and worry in children is
lacking. The largest body of work in this domain has linked child worry/GAD with biases
in information processing. Few studies have examined other potential cognitive variables,
such as intolerance of uncertainty, positive beliefs about worry, negative problem
orientation, and cognitive avoidance in adolescents or children. Work on the avoidant
function of worry in children is also lacking and children's physiological response to
worry is unknown. Although the literature is small, the few studies available will be
discussed here. In this section, work on information processing and GAD/worry will be
reviewed, followed by a discussion of the few studies of cognitive variables in
adolescents and children.
5.1.1.

Information processing,

Children with GAD display similar information processing styles to those found
in adults with GAD. These children tend to over estimate the likelihood of threatening
situations, show biased attention toward threat, and interpret ambiguity as threatening.
One study comparing children ages 9 to 18 years diagnosed with OAD, depression, and
nonclinical controls found that anxious participants reported that both future social and
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physical threat were more likely to occur (Dalgleish et aI., 1997). Interestingly, anxious
children rated threats as more likely to happen to others than themselves. Higher threat
interpretation in anxious children ages 8 to 17 years was also supported using a
homograph task (Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000). When
presented with homographs, children diagnosed with GAD were more likely to choose a
threatening meaning compared to non-anxious controls. Another study examined both
threat interpretation and estimates of likelihood of threat in a nonclinical sample of
children (mean age= 10.71 years) (Suarez & Bell-Dolan, 2001). Children were
categorized as high worriers or non-worriers and presented with threatening and
ambiguous vignettes. Worried children provided higher threat ratings for both types of
vignettes and rated future negative events as much more likely than non-worriers.
Childhood GAD has also been associated with attentional biases. When GAD,
mixed anxious-depressed, and nonclinical children (ages 9 to 18 years) viewed threat and
depression related stimuli, the GAD group showed bias toward threat-related, but not
depression-related, material. (Taghavi,Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1999).
The mixed anxiety-depression group failed to show bias toward either material type.
Taghavi et al. (2003) also found support for attentional bias in GAD children ages using
the modified Stroop task (mean ages = 13.47 for the GAD group, mean age=14.50 for the
control group). When participants were instructed to name the color of happy, neutral,
threat or depression related words, GAD children showed significant interference, such
that naming the color of the negative (combined threat-related and depression-related)
words required more time than neutral words. This effect was not found for nonanxious
children. A similar pattern of attentional bias was found when emotional face stimuli
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were used as probes. Comparing children with GAD to nonanxious controls (ages 7 to 12
years) showed that only children with severe GAD, as measured by clinician severity
ratings, displayed a bias toward both angry and happy faces (Waters, Mogg, Bradley, &
Pine, 2008). Children with lower anxiety severity did not differ statistically from the
control group, who showed no attentional bias. These results may be somewhat
confounded, however, as more than half of the children in the GAD group also met
criteria for social anxiety disorder.
Children with GAD also show higher threat interpretations of ambiguous
situations. An initial sample of children ages 7 to 12 years was administered measures of
GAD, separation anxiety, and social anxiety symptoms (Bogels, Snieder, & Kindt, 2003).
Children who scored in the top and bottom 10% of each measure were then presented
with nine ambiguous stories and asked to give interpretations and action plans. Results
showed that anxious children described more negative interpretations compared to the
control children. There was no difference, however, in coping plans. Further, children
with GAD showed no specific dysfunctional interpretations compared to the other
anxiety groups.
In an attempt to determine profiles associated with specific disorders Dalgleish et
al. (2003) compared children with major depressive disorder, GAD, and post-traumatic
stress disorder on multiple information processing variables, including memory,
attention, and prospective cognition (mean child age for the groups ranged from 12.83
years to 15.58 years). Results showed that anxious children showed a bias toward
threatening but not depression-related material, an effect driven by the GAD children, as
the PTSD group showed no bias. GAD and PTSD groups did not differ in their estimation

39

of likelihood of threatening events, either for self or others. Anxious and depressed
groups did not differ on the memory task.
5.1.2 Intolerance of Uncertainty

Work on intolerance of uncertainty has just recently begun with children, likely
due to the fact that reliable and valid measures were not available. Comer et ai. (2009)
recently modified a measure of intolerance of uncertainty for use with children ages 7 to
17 years. Their results found support for the measure and its relation with worry,
indicating that intolerance of uncertainty correlated positively with worry and showed
adequate utility in distinguishing clinically anxious from community samples. There were
no age or sex effects for the anxious sample, although interestingly intolerance of
uncertainty decreased with child age in the community group. These initial findings
suggest that intolerance of uncertainty may also be relevant for childhood worry,
although much work is yet to be done in this area.
5.1.3 Beliefs About Worry
Studies of metacognition in children are just beginning to emerge. One group
examining anxious and nonanxious children ages 8 to 13 years found that 30% of
nonanxious children reported that their worry had some positive features compared to
GAD/OAD children who reported no positive (Muris et aI., 1998). Another study of
adolescents aged 13 to 17 years found support for a five factor model of metacognition,
including (1) positive beliefs, (2) uncontrollability and danger, (3) cognitive confidence,
(4) superstition-punishment-responsibility, and (5) cognitive self-consciousness
(Cartwright-Hatton et aI., 2004). Each factor showed significant correlations with
measures of anxiety, depression, and obsessions. Although no measure of worry was

40

included in the study design, results indicate that adolescents experience a range of
metacognition similar to adults. Bacow et al. (Bacow, Pincus, Ehrenreich, & Brody,
2009) adapted a similar questionnaire for use with children ages 7 to 17 years. Results
supported the hypothesized four factor structure including positive metaworry, negative
metaworry, superstitious, punishment and responsibility beliefs, and cognitive
monitoring. Each of the four subscales correlated positively with worry, even after
controlling for worry content, and the cognitive monitoring subscale discriminated
clinical from nonclinical children (with nonclinical children reporting higher levels of
cognitive awareness). Child age and cognitive monitoring also correlated positively.
Finally, a sex and age interaction was found, with adolescent girls scoring higher on the
total score compared to adolescent boys. There were no sex differences for younger
children.
In a recent review, Ellis and Hudson (2010) discuss the applicability of the

metacognitive model of worry to child populations. Their review of the literature
suggests partial support for the downward extension of metacognitive adult models to
adolescents and children. They found that positive beliefs about worry were normal in
children and adolescents with high and low levels of worry and mixed support for the
association of worry and negative beliefs. The authors also found mixed results for the
hypothesis that age is associated with changes in metacognitive development. The
authors note that the use of different measures assessing worry and metacognition likely
playa role in the contradictory findings to date.
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5.1.4 Integrated Models
Integrated models, incorporating several the previously discussed cognitive
variables, have tested the applicability of conceptual adult models to adolescent samples.
One group examined associations of intolerance of uncertainty, positive beliefs about
worry, negative problem orientation, and thought suppression in a sample of adolescents
(Laugesen et aI., 2003). Results showed that, after controlling for physical symptoms and
gender, beliefs about worry, problem orientation, and intolerance of uncertainty
significantly predicted worry scores. Thought suppression, however, did not contribute to
the prediction. The study also used a discriminant analysis to predict membership of
moderate or high worry groups, revealing that only intolerance of uncertainty and
problem orientation contributed to the classification, while beliefs about worry and
thought suppression did not. A later study by Gosselin and others (2007) examined
associations between beliefs about worry, cognitive avoidance, and worry in a sample of
high school students, ages 12 to 19 years. Participants were divided into high (>80 th
percentile) and moderate (40 th _60 th percentile) worry groups based on worry scores. After
controlling for age and gender, high worriers endorsed stronger beliefs about worry,
including that worry helps to solve problems and worry helps to avoid the worst. When
predicting worry scores, the belief that worry helps to avoid the worst explained
additional variance beyond age and gender, while the belief that worry helps to solve
problems did not. Further, the high worry group reported using more avoidance strategies
than the moderate worry group on all five avoidance domains, including avoidance of
triggers, thought substitution, distraction, thought suppression, and transformation of
images. The largest effect sizes were found for avoidance of triggers and thought
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substitution. When predicting worry scores, all avoidance strategies expect
"transformation of images" contributed to the regression equation.
5.1.5 Other process and maintenance variables
Two other studies have examined children's attempts to cope with their worry
(Muris, Meesters, Merckelbach, Sermon, & Zwakhalen, 1998; Szabo & Lovibond, 2004).
Both studies used an interview approach to gather information about children's worry.
One study showed that children ages 8 to 13 years used distraction strategies (thinking
about other things and engaging in some other activity) and seeking social support most
frequently in their attempts to resists or control their worry (Muris et aI., 1998). Children
who met criteria for GAD/OAD attempted to distract themselves from their worries less
frequently than nonclinical children (Muris et aI., 1998). In another study, children ages 8
to 13 years reported using distraction most frequently to end their worry, followed by
decision making (decided how to cope with stressor), and seeking social support (Szabo
& Lovibond, 2004). Anxious and nonanxious groups did not differ in worry control

strategies. Children in both clinic referred and non-referred groups reported that their
worry consisted primarily of anticipation of future negative events (63% and 53% of
worry, respectively). For the clinic referred group the second greatest percentage of
worry consisted of rumination (17%) while the non-referred group reported problem
solving (30%) (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004).
5.1.3

Discussion

Overall, work examining potential process and maintenance variables in
childhood worry is lacking. Of all the potentially relevant variables, information
processing has received the most attention. Generally, the data support the notion that
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children with GAD process information differently from nonanxious children; however,
additional evidence is needed to support the hypothesis that children process information
differently from children with other anxiety disorders. In addition to information
processing, there is a growing literature examining metacognition and intolerance of
uncertainty in adolescents and children. Recent work (Cartwright-Hatton et aI., 2004;
Gosselin et aI., 2007; Laugesen et aI., 2003) in adolescent samples supports the
importance of metacognition, beliefs about worry, problem orientation, intolerance of
uncertainty and cognitive avoidance in worry. The recent validation of two measures, the
MCQ-C (Bacow et aI., 2009) and the rusc (Comer et aI., 2009), with children as young
as age seven years provides new opportunities to study these variables in relation to
worry. Preliminary findings suggest that intolerance of uncertainty and metacognition in
children is similar to that in adults and is associated with anxiety and/or worry. Overall,
however, these data are limited by a lack of comparison to other anxiety disorders as a
control group. Whether these cognitive variables are unique to GAD and/or worry
remains untested. Only one known study to date (Dalgleish et aI., 2003) compared
children diagnosed with GAD to children diagnosed with other anxiety diagnoses. It may
be that cognitive processes function similarly across all anxiety disorders or across levels
of worry severity; however, more work is needed before such conclusions are drawn.
5.2

Parenting and childhood worry

As previously discussed, several recent reviews have examined the links between
parenting behaviors and childhood anxiety (Bagels & Brechman-Toussaint, 2006;
McLeod et aI., 2007; van der Bruggen et aI., 2008; Wood et aI., 2003). Particularly
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relevant to the current discussion are several studies that have attempted to isolate
specific parenting behaviors associated child GAD or worry.
5.2.1

Perceived parenting and self-report worry

Consistent with findings that parenting is associated childhood anxiety generally,
studies of perceived parenting also show relations with worry specifically. Most work has
used the EMBU-C (Egna Minnen Betraffende Uppfostran, My memories of upbringing:
Perris, 1980), a retrospective self-report measure of perceived parenting, to measure
parental behavior. One study of a community sample of children 9 to 13 years found that
self-report worry scores correlated positively with both maternal and paternal anxious
rearing and rejection, and maternal rejection (Muris, Meesters, Merckelbach, &
Hiilsenbeck, 2000). Another study using the same measure with an older sample of
children ages 13 to 16 years found significant positive correlations between worry and
anxious rearing and overprotection of both parents for girls, but only overprotection of
both parents for boys (Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters, & van den Brand, 2002). Findings
of these two studies were partially replicated with a clinic referred anxious sample of
children ages 7 to 18 years (8 with a diagnosis of GAD), with significant positive
correlations between parental rejection and worry, but not anxious rearing,
overprotection, or warmth (Brown & Whiteside, 2008). Analysis of associations between
parenting factors and worry for the GAD sample alone were not conducted.
5.2.2

Perceived parenting and self-report GAD symptoms

Parenting has also been linked with measures of GAD clinical symptoms in
children. Results from a self-report study of primary school children ages 8 to 12 years
showed that parental anxious rearing, mother's control, and father's emotional warmth
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each correlated with GAD symptoms (Muris & Merckelback, 1998). Interestingly, this
same pattern of results was also found for separation anxiety symptoms, but not for other
anxiety disorders. Another study of nonc1inical adolescents ages 12 to 19 years (Hale,
Engels, & Meeus, 2006) found significant correlations between perceived parental
alienation, rejection, and control with GAD symptoms, although only alienation and
rejection made unique contributions to symptom prediction. A follow-up multi-group
structural equation model of the relative contributions of parental alienation and rejection
to GAD symptoms showed differences based on child gender and age (younger and
older). Analyses showed that perceived parental alienation was significantly related to
GAD in all four groups whereas rejection was related to all groups except the older male
sample.
5.2.3

Self-report attachment and worry

Others studies have used measures of attachment to examine relations between
parenting and worry. Two studies have shown that insecure attachment is associated with
higher levels of worry in children ages 7 to 18 years (Brown & Whiteside, 2008) and 9 to
13 years (Muris et aI., 2000), with no differences between ambivalent and avoidant
attachment styles. A stepwise regression examining contributions of parenting and
attachment status found that only parental rejection and insecure attachment explained
significant variance in worry scores (Brown & Whiteside, 2008). A study with
undergraduate students found that those who met criteria for GAD based on self-report
questionnaires indicated less secure attachment than their normal counterparts (Eng &
Heimberg, 2006). Cassidy and colleagues (1994) conducted two studies to further
examine differences in attachment associated with GAD. In the first study a sample of
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undergraduate students who met criteria for GAD using a self-report form reported higher
levels of rejection and role reversaVenmeshment (defined as the need to protect and fear
of losing a primary care giver) compared to those who reported no symptoms of GAD.
Students who reported GAD symptoms were also more likely to describe feelings of
anger and vulnerability toward their mother. In a second study, these researchers
examined clinically diagnosed adult GAD subjects and non anxious controls. Results
partially supported the previous study, with GAD subjects reporting more role reversal
and enmeshment, as well as feelings of anger and vulnerability toward their mothers
(Cassidyet aI., 1994).
5.2.4

Discussion

Results from the previously reviewed work suggest an association between
parenting and worry/GAD in children, although methods and measures have been
inconsistent. One limitation of the literature is the reliance on self-report. No study to
date has used parent report or direct observation of parenting to examine relations with
child worry. Because children in these samples report high levels of worry or symptoms
of GAD, perceptions of their parents may be skewed by anxious cognitions or
interpretive biases. A lack of other clinical comparison groups also limits these findings.
Without comparison groups of children with depression or other anxiety disorders,
conclusions cannot be made about the uniqueness of the association between these
parenting behaviors and worry. The cross-sectional designs of these studies also limit the
directionality of our conclusions. It appears that parenting is related to worry and
symptoms of GAD, but precisely how the two are related remains speculative. Although
it is tempting to suggest that role reversal or enmeshed parent-child relationships cause
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children to worry, the current data do not support this hypothesis. An alternative
hypothesis could be that worried children elicit certain types of parenting behaviors from
their caregivers. Future longitudinal work could address these methodological concerns.
5.3

Relations between parenting and worry related variables

Although associations between parenting and childhood anxiety are generally
well supported, links between parenting and specific worry related cognitive variables
have not been well studied. The next section examines potential parental influences on
children's cognition, specifically those cognitive variables hypothesized to relate to
childhood anxiety and/or worry. The association between parenting and child information
processing has received the most attention, although there are several studies examining
associations between parenting and child beliefs about worry and intolerance of
uncertainty.
5.3.1

Parent influence on information processing

The impact of parenting on information processing in children in the context of
GAD or worry has received limited attention. However, there is a small literature
demonstrating significant relations between parent and child information processing in
children with anxiety disorders broadly. Generally, these studies suggest that children's
interpretations of situations are associated with their parent's interpretation, although the
mechanisms for this are unclear. No studies to date have examined worry or GAD
specifically, and so work with children with anxiety disorders broadly will be reviewed.
Several studies have supported the hypothesis that parents influence children's
threat interpretations. A common method for testing this association examines parental
and child responses to ambiguous situations. One study compared anxious and
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nonanxious mothers and their children, ages 7 to 15 years, on their responses to
ambiguous situations (Cresswell, Schniering, & Rapee, 2005). Results showed that
mothers of anxious children had higher threat interpretation scores and mother's threat
interpretation scores correlated positively with their child's. Another study extended this
work by including a clinical control group. Researchers compared interpretations of
mothers and children, ages 7 to 12 years, with an anxiety disorder, externalizing disorder,
and healthy controls (Gifford, Reynolds, Bell, & Wilson, 2008). Participants were
presented with homographs and homophones and prompted to interpret the stimuli.
Results showed that anxious children made more threatening interpretations than nonclinical children but not externalizing children. Mothers of anxious children did not make
more threatening interpretations than other mothers, and contrary to Cresswell et al. 's
(2005) findings, mother and child interpretations were not correlated. However, mother's
interpretation bias was associated with child's anxiety and child's interpretation was
associated with mother's anxiety. Although results did not support a direct association
between mother and child threat interpretations, the correlation between maternal anxiety
and child threat interpretation suggests an influence that warrants additional attention.
Other work has looked more explicitly at the mechanism by which parents
influence their children. These studies have primarily used a procedure in which children
are first asked to interpret ambiguous situations alone, followed by a family discussion
task, to examine parental influences on children's responses. Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, and
Ryan (1996) examined mothers and children, ages 7 to 14 years, who were diagnosed
with an anxiety disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, or no disorder. Anxious and
oppositional children were more likely than nonclinical children to interpret ambiguous
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scenarios as threatening and anxious children were more likely than both comparison
groups to choose avoidant coping plans. When parents were asked to predict their child's
response, parents of anxious children responded similarly to their anxious children,
making a higher number of threat interpretations and predicting avoidant responses by
their children. After a discussion with their parents, anxious children increased their
avoidant responses, while nonclinical children decreased avoidance responses. These data
suggest that parents playa role in their children's responses by reinforcing threatening
interpretations and modeling avoidant behavior by providing reassurance and sheltering
their children from potentially anxiety provoking situations. The authors called this the
Family Enhancement of Avoidant Responses effect, or the FEAR effect. Similar work by
Chorpita, Albano, and Barlow (1996) hypothesized that parental verbalization contributes
to the development of threat interpretations in children. They suggest that parental
discussion of threat or danger primes children for future threat interpretation. Four
anxious families and eight non-clinical families, with children ages 9 to 13 years, were
presented with four ambiguous situations. Children first responded individually and then
discussed the scenarios with their parents. Results showed that anxious expression by
parents was related to changes in the child's interpretations and plans, although only the
correlation for fathers was significant. The small sample size of this study and low power
limit its generalizability, although the preliminary results are compelling.
These results have not been replicated consistently, however. Other studies have
failed to demonstrate this effect (Logsdon-Conradsen, 1998, as cited in Shortt et aI.,
2001; Shortt et aI., 2001). Results from one study with children ages 6 to 14 years suggest
that the demands of the task, specifically whether or not the discussion would determine
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treatment eligibility for the child, influenced the FEAR effect (Shortt et aI.., 2001). Their
results indicated that families in the treatment irrelevant group were more likely to
change to avoidant plans after a family discussion. Results also showed that maternal
distress was associated with the FEAR effect.
Other work has examined the impact of parents on children's interpretations of
ambiguity in terms of emotional reasoning and social referencing. Emotional reasoning is
defined as drawing conclusions about the environment based on emotional states ( e. g.,
"I'm anxious so there must be something to be fearful of') and social referencing refers
to forming judgments about a stimulus based on the perceived reactions of others.
(Morren, Muris, &Kindt, 2004). Children, ages 7 to 13 years, were first administered a
self-report spider phobia questionnaire as a measure of anxiety and then read four stories
describing situations of social, separation, generalized, or parent anxiety. Each story had
four versions including objective/subjective danger information and positive/anxiety
response information, so that each combination of danger and response information was
presented. Results showed that children's interpretations of danger relied on both
objective information as well as anxiety related signals from parents. Children rated the
parent anxiety story containing parental anxiety response information (e.g., "It frightens
your mum and her legs start to tremble" p. 8) as more dangerous than the parent anxiety
story with positive response information (e.g., "Your mum looks happy and she smiles
and waves to her friend in the car" p. 8). Interestingly, child anxiety was not a significant
predictor of child response to the parent anxiety story. Also of note was a significant
anxiety by age interaction for the parent anxiety story. In children with high trait anxiety,
the parent-based reasoning effect decreased, while this effect increased in children with
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low trait anxiety. Although replication of this research is needed, this methodology
contributes to the growing body ofliterature on parental influences on children's
cognitive biases.
Other work has used the Stroop task to examine associations between parenting
and child information processing. Moradi et al. (1999) examined the processing of threat
related and neutral words in children of parents with posttraumatic stress disorder and
control parents. Children were not diagnosed with any psychiatric disorder and groups
did not differ in anxiety level. Children, ages 9 to 17 years, were presented with words of
happy, neutral, depression-related, threat-related, and trauma-related content. A
significant interaction of word type and group indicated that children of parents with
PTSD were slower to name threat-related words compared to neutral words. In contrast,
children of normal controls were faster to name depression-related words compared to
neutral words.
5.3.2

Parent influence on beliefs

A number of theoretical models hypothesize that the behavior of anxious parents
promotes the development of dysfunctional cognitions in their children, increasing their
risk for anxiety disorders (Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Vasey & Dadds, 2001). However,
few empirical studies have examined these hypotheses. In terms of the proposed model,
the influence of parenting on children's metacognition about worry is of particular
interest. Only one study to date (Gallagher & Cartwright-Hatton, 2008) has examined the
influence of parental behaviors on children's beliefs about anxiety. A community sample
of adolescents, aged 16 to 18 years, completed measures of perceived parenting, anxiety,
cognitive errors, metacognition about worry, and thought control. Results showed
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correlations between metacognition and overreactive parenting, defined as punitive,
harsh, or inconsistent discipline. Overreactive parenting also predicted trait anxiety, and
metacognition partially mediated the association. Finally, children of overreactive parents
reported more dysfunctional positive and negative beliefs about worry. Although not
specific to clinical worry, a recent study of parents and children (mean age of 16 years)
with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder suggests that parents have some influence on their
children's metabeliefs (Jacobi, Calamari, & Woodard, 2006). Cognitive models ofOCD
share some similarities with models of GAD in that thoughts are monitored, evaluated,
and followed with suppression or control attempts. In a study of parental influences on
child metabeliefs, adolescents and their parents completed self-report measures of
anxiety, obsessional beliefs, and cognitive self-consciousness. Results showed small but
significant correlations between parent and child report on subscales of the obsessional
beliefs, including over-responsibility, threat estimation, and thought importance/control
of thoughts. However, it should be noted that most parent and child variables showed no
relation.
5.3.3 Parent influence on intolerance of uncertainty
The role of parenting in children's intolerance of uncertainty has yet to be fully
explored. Only one known study has examined the influence of parenting on children's
ability to cope with uncertainty. Zlomke and Young (2009) tested a meditational model
proposing that children's intolerance of uncertainty mediates the relation between
perceived parenting style and anxiety, depression, and worry. Results from a community
sample of older adolescents and young adults (ages 18 to 23 years) showed that
intolerance of uncertainty mediated the association of perceived anxious rearing with
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worry and anxiety, but not depression. Although promising, this work is limited by its
self-report nature. Future work with younger adolescents and school aged children, in
addition to observational or other report measures of parenting, will be necessary to
determine if these effects can be replicated and if they generalize to younger samples.
5.3.4

Discussion

Children rely on their parents for information about the world, which shapes their
behavioral and cognitive approaches to internal and external stimuli. When parents
display anxiety in response to a situation, children likely learn that there is something to
fear. Parenting has also been hypothesized to influence child cognitions and
metacognition. The previous section provides support for the idea that parenting is
associated with worry in children, although how the two are linked remains unclear.
There is some support for the association between parenting/parental beliefs and
children's metacognition and intolerance of uncertainty, however, replication of these
results is needed, as well as studies including younger children and clinical populations.
Associations between parenting and worry related cognitive variables, such as problem
orientation and cognitive avoidance, have yet to be examined. Given the importance of
these variables to adult models of worry, this represents an area of potential growth for
the future. The first step is to establish if such cognitive variables are in fact important in
understanding worry in children. If this is indeed the case, work should then move
forward to identify how parental factors influence these variables. Understanding how
parents reinforce or model thoughts and behaviors, both positive and negative, could also
inform the model and potentially provide targets for intervention. Future work should
also consider the impact of parent and child sex when examining the influence of
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parenting. At least two studies have reported that the relations between perceived
parenting and worry depends on the sex of the parent or the child (Muris, Meesters,
Merckelbach, & Hiilsenbeck, 2000; Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters, & van den Brand,
2002). Continuing to investigate how mother's and father's influences differ from one
another and how each parent impacts sons and daughters differently will be important.

6.

The current study
This review has summarized literature outlining theoretical models of clinical

worry in adults and the role of parenting in childhood anxiety generally. These literatures
were integrated and a conceptual model specific to the process and maintenance of
clinical worry in children proposed. Literature supporting the hypothesized model was
then reviewed. Although there is preliminary support for some relations proposed in the
model, many remain speculative and rely, in the absence of information about childhood
worry, on the adult worry literature.
The next step is to begin a systematic testing of the hypothesized associations
while also examining the role of cognitive development and the potential effects of child
sex. At each step of model testing, the relations between variables should account for the
potential impact of the child's cognitive development. Ideally this would be done using a
longitudinal design, although testing the applicability of the model using a cross-sectional
design would be a more feasible first step toward justifying the increased costs associated
with a long term longitudinal study. It will be especially important to test this model with
children around the ages of 7 and 8 as it is most likely that the cognitive abilities
emerging at this developmental stage allow for generalized worry (Vasey, 1994).
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As the proposed theoretical model is large, it seems logical to distinguish three
separate parts of the model, each building upon the previous. At the heart of the model
are the process variables associated with child worry, hypothesized to be most closely
involved in childhood worry based on work with adults and adolescents. Specifically, this
includes testing associations between worry and the cognitive variables of beliefs about
worry, intolerance of uncertainty, information processing factors, and problem
orientation. Having established a central model, the role of maintaining factors, including
negative beliefs about worry, suppression attempts, cognitive avoidance, and autonomic
inflexibility can then be considered. Finally, the influence of specific parenting behaviors,
parental modeling, and impact of parent sex on process and maintenance factors can be
considered.
This study represents the first step in this model testing process and will examine
relations between four cognitve variables and worry, while also examining effects related
to cognitive development and sex (see Figure 2). Four cognitive variables of intolerance
of uncertainty, beliefs about worry, negative problem orientation, and threat
interpretation were included in this study, as well as two self-report measures of worry
and two measures of cognitive development in addition to child age. Using two measures
of worry allows for the replication of results and decreases the likelihood that effects may
be specific to particular measures.
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Figure 2. Hypothesized relations between cognitive variables, worry, and cognitive
development.

Several related hypotheses will be tested. First, general measures of association
between variables will be examined. It is hypothesized that cognitive development will
correlate positively with cognitive variables and with worry and that cognitive variables
will correlate positively with measures of worry. Next, the effect of cognitive
development on the three cognitive variables will be examined. Specifically, it is
hypothesized that cognitive development will predict scores on measures of beliefs about
worry, intolerance of uncertainty, threat interpretation, and negative problem orientation,
and that cognitive development will moderate this association. Relations between
cognitive variables and worry will then be examined. Specifically, it is hypothesized that
beliefs about worry, intolerance of uncertainty, threat interpretation, and negative
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problem orientation will predict child worry and that cognitive development measures
will moderate the association, such that the strength of the predictor variables increases
with advanced development. To examine the effect of child sex, male and female
children will be compared on the cognitive measures and measures of worry. It is
expected that female children will report higher scores than male children on measures of
beliefs about worry, intolerance of uncertainty, threat interpretation, negative problem
orientation, and worry. Finally, it is hypothesized that the cognitive variables of beliefs
about worry, intolerance of uncertainty, threat interpretation, and negative problem
orientation will distinguish clinical from nonclinicallevels of worry.
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METHOD

Recruitment
This study was reviewed and approved by the University of Louisville's Internal
Review Board (Approval #09.0612 ). Participants were recruited in two ways. First, local
elementary schools were invited to participate. Three Catholic and one public school
agreed to send home study materials with children in grades two through five.
Participants were also recruited through flyers placed throughout the community. Efforts
were made to include equal proportions of male and female children and children across
the age range. Recruitment attempts were also directed toward including ethnic minority
groups proportional to the ethnic composition of the Louisville metro area.
The required sample size was calculated a priori using G* Power 3.1, (Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). To detect a large effect size (.40) with a power of
.80, a sample size of 34 is necessary for a correlation analysis. In order to detect a large
effect size (.35) with power of .80 in a regression model with a total of 10 predictors, a
sample of 54 is required. To detect a large effect size (.80) with power of .80 with at-test,
a sample of 46 is necessary. Thus, a total of 54 children were required for this study.
Procedure
Study participation included completing self-report forms at home and a short
telephone interview with the researcher or a research assistant at a date and time selected
by the participant and his or her parent(s). Children recruited through schools were sent
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home with an infonnationalletter, parental consent and child assent fonns, and study
self-report fonns. Parents also received a fonn explaining the purpose and content of the
telephone interview. Children completed self-report fonns at home and returned
completed packets to their classroom. Children were required to return both parental
consent and child assent along with their completed packets to be included in the sample.
Packets were collected from the classroom two weeks following the distribution date.
A total of 661 packets were sent home and 74 returned, for a response rate of
approximately 11.2%. Children recruited through flyers (n=6) were screened briefly and
packets delivered to their home and picked up by researchers. Telephone interviews took
place several days to one month following the time of measure completion, based on
dates selected by participants and availability during selected times. Interviews lasted
approximately 15 minutes. All participating children were entered into a drawing for I of
4 $25 gift cards to Borders bookstore for their participation.

Participants
Participants were 80 children between the ages of 8 and 12 years. Seventy-one
percent of the sample was female (n = 57). The average age was 9.6 years (SD = 1.10).
More than half of the children were 9 or 10 years old (8-year-olds n=12, 9-year-olds
n=21, 10-year-olds n=22, ll-year-olds n=12, and 12-year-olds n=3, and 10 children did
not indicate age). Ethnic composition of the sample was primarily European American
(74%), 6% Hispanic/Latino, 3% Asian, 4% Other, and I % African American, and 12%
declined to answer.
A total of80 participants returned completed self-report measures. Twenty-four
participants had missing interview data due to missing contact infonnation (n=8) or were

60

unavailable when contact attempts were made (n=16). For those who were not available
at initial contact, several phone calls were made at various times of day over a three week
period. After leaving three voice messages, no further attempts were made to contact
children.
Measures
Please see Appendix A for copies of all measures.
Children's Opinions of Everyday Life Events (COELE; Suarez & Bell-Dolan,
2001). The COELE is an interview developed to measure children's interpretations of
ambiguous situations. Six ambiguous and six threatening vignettes are described, based
on previous work identifying areas of concern for children. Following the vignettes,
children are first asked what they think happened in each situation and responses are
coded as threat (1) or non-threat (0). Children then use a 5-point Likert type scale (1 = not
at all, 5 = extremely) to rate how worried, sad, and angry they would feel if this happened
to them, how threatening they find the situation, and how likely they think it is to occur.
The measure yields total scores for spontaneous threat interpretation, worry, sadness, and
anger ratings, threat rating, and likelihood rating. Test-retest reliability estimates for the
measure range from .52 (threat ratings for the ambiguous situations) to .77 (for the
likelihood ratings), and internal consistency scores range for .80 to .86. In the current
study, children were administered the COELE over the telephone in a session lasting
approximately 15 minutes. In order to reduce administration time, three ambiguous and
three threatening vignettes were chosen (each reflecting a family, social, and school
theme) and children did not rate anger. Children's spontaneous threat ratings for both
ambiguous and threatening vignettes were calculated separately and summed for a total
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threat interpretation score. The six interpretations were coded by a second rater, a
doctoral student in clinical psychology, for half of the participants. Inter-rater agreement
was very good, kappa=.86.
Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Child Version (PSWQ-C; Chorpita et aI.,
1997). The PSWQ-C is a 14 item measure designed to assess worry in children ages 6 to
18 years. Children rate each item on a scale from 0 (never true) to 3 (always true), with
higher scores indicating greater worry severity. Exploratory factor analysis revealed a
one-factor solution for the measure. The measure has adequate psychometric properties,
including good internal consistency, discriminant validity, and convergent validity with
the worry/oversensitivity scale of the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale
(Chorpita et aI., 1997). The measure also showed test-retest reliability of .92 (Chorpita et
aI., 1997).
Revised Child's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond,
1978). The RCMAS is a 37 item self report measure designed to measure several
components of anxiety in children and adolescents. Items are readable at a third grade
level and the measure has been shown to be reliable and valid for children in grades 1 to
12. Children indicate a yes/no response to each item. The RCMAS has three factors,
including physiological anxiety, worry/oversensitivity, and social concerns. For this study
only worry/oversensitivity scores were used in order to provide an additional measure of
worry. Reliability and validity estimates have been shown to be good to excellent (Gerard

& Reynolds, 2004) and internal consistency is good (Reynolds & Paget, 1983).For this
study, raw subscale scores were converted to age adjusted T -scores, based on published
norms (Reynolds & Paget, 1983).
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The Metacognitions Questionnaire for Children (MCQ; Bacow et aI., 2009).
The MCQ is a 24 item self-report questionnaire for children ages 7 to 17 years, adapted
from the Metacognitions Questionnaire for Adolescents (Cartwright-Hatton, Mather,
Illingworth, Harrington, & Wells, 2004). The measure is comprised of four factors,
including positive metaworry, negative metaworry,
superstition/punishment/responsibility beliefs, and cognitive monitoring. Children
indicate their agreement to the items using a 4-point scale (1 = do not agree, 2 = agree
slightly, 3 = agree moderately, 4 = agree very much). The MCQ-C has a Flesch-Kincaid
reading grade level of 2.0, indicating that the measure is appropriate for children reading
at a second grade level. Initial evaluations indicate good internal consistency (alpha = .87
for nonclinical and alpha = .89 for clinical samples), concurrent validity with measures of
worry (subscales range from r = .21 to .48), and criterion validity, with the clinical
sample scoring significantly higher than the nonclinical sample (Bacow et aI., 2009).

Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale for Children_(IUSC; Comer, Roy, Furr,
Gotimer, Beidas, Dugas, & Kendall, 2009). The IUSC is a 27 item self-report measure
for children 7 to 17 years of age. The child measure is based on the Intolerance of
Uncertainty Scale for adults (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Freeston et aI., 1994) and assesses
children's tendency toward negative reactions to uncertain situations and events. Children
are asked to indicate their agreement with the items using a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 3
=

somewhat, and 5 = very much). A preliminary study suggests that the measure has

strong psychometric properties, including internal consistency (alpha = .92) and
convergent validity (correlations with anxiety and worry, r =.71 and r = .75,
respectively).
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Social Problem Solving Inventory-Revised-Child Adaptation (SPSI;D'Zurilla
& Nezu, 1990). The SPSI-R is a 52 item self report measure assessing approaches to

solving problems in adults. The measure consists of five factors, including positive
problem orientation, negative problem orientation, rational problem solving,
impulsivity/carelessness style, and avoidance style. Currently, no measures of problem
orientation are available for use with children. For the current study, the Negative
Orientation (10 items) subscale was adapted for children ages 7 to 12 years. Items were
reworded to be appropriate at a third grade reading level (as measured by the FleschKincaid reading level), while maintaining meaning. Preliminary item changes were
reviewed and modified with three doctoral students in clinical psychology and the lab
director of the Healthy Parents-Healthy Kids Research lab.
Cognitive Development. Three variables were used to estimate cognitive
development. Child age was used as the primary measure, along with two cognitive
abilities hypothesized to relate specifically with the ability to worry, including awareness
of thoughts and the ability to generate multiple possible outcomes.

Child age. Child age has frequently been used by other researchers to study
cognitive development in relation to the ability to understand or perform certain tasks
(Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1993; 1995; 1998; 2000; 2004). Child age has also been used
to examine trends in worry content and prevalence (Muris, Merckelbach, Gadet, &
Moulaert, 2000; Vasey, Crnic, & Carter, 1994).

Awareness of thoughts. The ability to recognize internal streams of thought is
inherent in the current definition of worry, and therefore it is expected to have some
relation with worry. Indeed, Bacow et al. (2009) showed that cognitive monitoring
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increased with child age, suggesting that this is a cognitive ability that increases with age.
For this study, awareness of internal thoughts was assessed using the cognitive
monitoring subscale of the MCQC.
Interpretation total. Vasey (1993) suggests that children's ability to generate and
reason about possible outcomes may influence their ability to worry. To measure this
ability, an additional question was asked following the COELE interview, modified from
the catastrophizing interview used previously with children by Vaesy et al. (1994). In
Vasey et al.' s approach, children were presented with vignettes of worried children and
asked to elaborate on the worries by responding to prompts of "Why would that bother
him/her?" or "Why would that be bad?" Because catastrophizing interviews in the first
person have been associated with considerable anxiety in adults (Vasey & Borkovec,
1992), the approach was modified to reduce the possibility that children would
experience distress during the telephone interview. In this study, children were again read
the first vignette from the COELE and instructed to generate as many possible
explanations for the situation as they could. Children were prompted with "Try to think
of another explanation" until they could no longer generate any additional responses.
This generated two measures, including a total interpretations variable consisting of the
sum of all responses, and a threat total consisting of the sum of the threatening responses
only.
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RESULTS

Preliminary Examination of Measures
The final sample included 56 children with complete data. An additional 14
children had self-report data but no interview data (n=70), and an additional 10
participants had self-report data but did not provide demographic or contact information
for the interview (n=80). To increase power, efforts were made to include as much data
as possible for each analysis.
Of the 80 completed self-report packets, there were 28 missing items (of a total
of 80 participants x 98 items per packet = 7840 items), or less than 1% of the total items.
No participant had more than one missing data point. Missing items were replaced with
the series mean.
Descriptive statistics. Each measure will be briefly discussed in terms of
published norms. Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1.

66

Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics afStudy Variables.

Sample Mean

Clinical

Nonclinical

Worry Measures
PSWQ-C (shortened)

13.54 (6.59)

PSWQ-C (standard)

19.55 (7.63)

23.84 (9.3)

Worry/Oversensitivity T*

56.90 (4.73)

54.9 (1.9)

7.1 (5.8)

Worry/Oversensitivity Raw 5.98(3.05)

11.79 (5.9)

4.04 (2.84)

Cognitive Measures
IUSC-C

66.49 (20.69)

Problem-Negative

16.91 (1.21)

MCQ-Positive
MCQ-Negative

64.97 (21.7)

52.81 (18.)

8.83 (3.07)

8.91 (3.96)

10.15 (2.91)

13.63 (4.64)

13.55 (4.27)

12.50 (4.11)

14.99 (4.48)

14.53 (4.32)

16.45 (4.02)

Cognitive Development
MCQ-CSC

All Possible Interpretationsl\ 5.44 (4.12)
Note. Worry/oversensitivity n=70; I\All Possible Interpretations n=56; . data not available

Overall, the sample reported higher than expected levels of worry, intolerance of
uncertainty, and metacognition. The average adjusted Penn State Worry QuestionnaireChild score for this sample was much higher than that of another community sample
(Muris et aI., 2001), and falls in the 86th percentile based on community norms (Muris et
aI., 2001). Standard Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Child scores were also elevated
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compared to previous published norms for community samples (Comer et aI., 2009).
Scores on the worry/oversensitivity subscale also suggest that the sample is highly
worried. The average T score for the current sample was comparable to that of a sample
of children with anxiety disorders (Mattison, Bagnato, & Brubaker, 1988). Further, 41 %
of the sample scored above 60, a cut score considered "pathological" and used to
discriminate clinical from nonclinical children (Mattison, Bagnato, & Brubaker, 1988).
The sample also strongly endorsed intolerance of uncertainty and metacognitive
variables. This group reported higher than expected levels of intolerance of uncertainty
compared to a community sample mean reported in the rusc validation study and was
again closer to that of a sample of children with anxiety disorders than those from a
community sample (Comer et aI., 2009). Scores on measures of beliefs about worry were
also high, and compared to the means reported in the MCQ-C validation study, the
current sample scores more closely resembles scores from children with anxiety disorders
than those from a community sample (Bacow et aI., 2009).
Preliminary psychometrics of the negative problem orientation scale of the Social
Problem Solving Inventory-Child adapted measure were examined by assessing internal
consistency and convergent validity. Chronbach's coefficient alpha of .86 suggested
adequate internal consistency and item-total correlations, using Pearson product-moment
correlation, ranged from .27 to .82. Only one item failed to correlate at an acceptable
level (Item 22, "When I can't fix a problem on my first try, I get sad and give up" r = .27,
p

=

.02, based on criteria used by Chorpita et aI., 1997 for adapting the Penn State Worry

Questionnaire for children), but the correlation was significant so the item was included.
These statistics were also examined for younger (8-9) and older (10-12) children
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separately. Results mirrored those when groups were combined. The measure showed
adequate internal consistency for both groups, with alpha = .77 for younger children and
alpha = .90 for older children. Item 1 failed to correlate significantly with the total score
for the younger group, but all other items correlated significantly, ranging from .49 to
.74. In the older group Item 22 failed to correlate significantly with the total score.
Correlations for other items ranged from .60 to .89. The measure appeared to have strong
convergent validity, as evidenced by expected associations with other related variables.
Negative problem orientation correlated positively with the Penn State Worry
Questionnaire-Child, r = .52,p<.001, worry/oversensitivity, r = .54,p<.001, and
intolerance of uncertainty, r = .76, p<.OO 1.
Preliminary psychometrics of the shortened COELE were also examined. Means,
standard deviations, and alphas are presented in Table 2. Spontaneous threat
interpretation scores were calculated for the ambiguous and threatening situations
separately by summing responses across each of the three stories (totals ranged from 0 to
3). Mean worry, sad, threat, and likelihood ratings were also calculated by averaging
across the three stories of each type. Total possible interpretation score is also presented.
Generally, internal consistency measures failed to meet acceptable standards (> .70,
Nunnally, 1978). When scores were collapsed across threat and ambiguous scenarios,
internal consistency improved somewhat, so that threat rating achieved an acceptable
level. Threat interpretation and worry rating still failed to meet standards of acceptability.
Due to these problems, worry and threat interpretation total score were not used in any
subsequent analyses. In place of threat interpretation total, average threat rating across
ambiguous and threat scenarios was used as a measure of threat interpretation for future
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analyses. Validity was assessed by examining correlations with worry measures. See
Table 3. Threat interpretation did not correlate with either measure of worry, contrary to
results from Saurez and Bell-Dolan (2001). Worry, threat, and likelihood ratings
correlated positively with both measures of worry.

Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics for COELE Variables.
Total Sample

Females
n=43
Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Males
n = 13
Mean (SD)

Threat Interpretation

Alphas
.49

Ambiguous Scenario 1.64 (.97)

1.72 (.88)

1.38 (.77)

.32

2.75 (.51)

2.72 (.55)

2.85 (.38)

.21

Threat Scenario
Average Threat Rating

.75

Ambiguous Scenario 2.90 (.76)

2.96 (.79)

2.72 (.80)

.44

Threat Scenario

3.08 (.88)

3.03 (1.06)

.72

3.07 (.92)

Average Worry Rating

.69

Ambiguous Scenario 3.17 (.76)

3.18 (.79)

3.12 (.70)

.46

3.42 (.78)

3.46 (.76)

3.31 (.88)

.62

Threat Scenario
Average Likelihood Rating

.70

Ambiguous Scenario 2.41 (.70)

2.43 (.76)

2.33 (.49)

.36

Threat Scenario

2.29 (.80)

2.34 (.82)

2.13 (.73)

.62

5.44 (4.12)

6.00 (4.52)

3.62 (1.19)

All Possible Interpretations

70

Table 3.
Correlations between COELE Variables and Worry Scores.
PSWQ-C

Worry/oversensitivity

Threat Interpretation

.01

.05

Avg Threat Rating

.41 **

.35**

Avg Worry Rating

.39**

.53**

A vg Likelihood Rating

.30*

.47**

All Possible Interpretations

-.11

-.12

*p<.05, **p<.OI

Examination of Model Assumptions
Normality of the variables was assessed by a visual inspection of a histogram as
well as examination of skewness and kurtosis z scores, where scores greater than 2.58 are
significant at the p <.01 level, the suggested cut point for small samples sizes (Field,
2005). Positive beliefs about worry showed significant positive skew based on the
histogram, and z score values for positive beliefs about worry and all possible
interpretations indicated significant skewness and/or kurtosis, so log transformations
were conducted. These transformations improved the distribution of both variables to
roughly normal. Transformed variables were used in future analyses.

Sample Characteristics
Because not all children had complete data sets, differences between the three
groups (complete, missing interviews, and missing interviews and demographics) were
examined. ANOVAs for Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Child and
worry/oversensitivity scores were nonsignificant, suggesting that data are missing at
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random and that failure to complete the interview or provide demographic data was not
related to worry severity.
Demographic and study variables were also examined across recruitment site to
examine possible sampling differences (schools and flyer). There was a significant
difference in child age, F( 4, 65) = 3.2 7, p =. 02,partial1]2 = .17, power = .81, and
Levene's test was significant, F (4,65) = 2.79,p = .03, so Dunnett's T3 was used for
pairwise comparisons. Pairwise comparisons showed that children from one of the
Catholic schools (M = 9.13, SD = .64) were significantly younger than children recruited
with flyers (M= 10.63, SD = 1.30),p = .02. Groups did not differ on Penn State Worry
Questionnaire-Child scores, but there was a difference on worry/oversensitivity scores, F
(4, 75) = 5.34,p = .001, partial 1]2 = .22, observed power = .96. Children recruited by
flyer (M = 3.62, SD = 3.20) were significantly less worried than children from the public
school (M= 7.35, SD = 2.85),p = .02, and one of the local Catholic schools (M=7.06,

SD = 2.62). Groups did not differ on any of the other cognitive variables. To control for
sampling differences, recruitment site was used as a covariate in all future analyses.

Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis One: Correlations between variables.
A. Cognitive development will correlate positively with cognitive variables and
with worry. Partial correlations, controlling for recruitment site, were examined.
Correlations are presented in Table 4. Before examining associations between cognitive
development and the other variables, it should be noted that cognitive development
measures were not correlated with one another. Child age did not correlate significantly
with cognitive monitoring or all possible interpretations. All possible interpretations also
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failed to correlate with cognitive monitoring. Because the all possible interpretations
variable did not appear to be an indicator of cognitive development and was not
associated with worry, it was not included in any future analyses.
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Table 4.

Partial Correlations Between Study Variables, Controllingfor Recruitment Site.
PSWQC W/O

IUSC NP

PB NB

Thrt
Rtg

Age Monitor All
Int

PSWQC
n

W/O
n

.59**
70

IUSC
n

.51 **
80

.59**
70

NP
n

.53**
80

.49**
70

.75**
80

PB
n

.14
80

.03
70

.32**
80

.29**
80

NB
n

.53**
80

.47**
70

.65**
80

.60**
80

.12
80

Thrt
Rtg
n

.24

.25

.29*

.39**

.15

.38**

56

56

56

56

56

56

Age
n

-.25*
70

-.17
70

.05
70

-.18
70

.05
70

-.06
70

-.11
56

Monitor .39**
80
n

.30*
70

.51 **
80

.43** .15
80
80

.55**
80

.40** -.17
56
70

-.12
56

.14
56

.05
56

All Int
n

-.04
56

.10 .14
56 56

.09
56

-.02
56

.15
56

Note. W/O = worry/oversensitivity subscale, NP = negative problem orientation, PB
positive beliefs about worry, NB = negative beliefs about worry, Thrt Int = threat
interpretation, All Int = all possible interpretations

*p<.05, **p<.OI
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The hypothesis that cognitive development measures would correlate positively
with cognitive variables was partially supported. Cognitive monitoring showed the
strongest relations, correlating positively with intolerance of uncertainty, negative
problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry, and threat rating but not with
positive beliefs. Surprisingly, child age did not correlate with any cognitive variables.
The hypothesis that cognitive development measures would correlate positively with
measures of worry was only partially supported. Child age correlated negatively with
Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Child scores but did not correlate with
worry/oversensitivity scores, while cognitive monitoring correlated positively with both
measures of worry.

B. Cognitive variables will correlate positively with measures of worry. The
hypothesis that cognitive variables would correlate with worry was largely supported.
Intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry
correlated positively with both worry measures, while positive beliefs about worry and
threat rating did not. Because these two variables do not appear related to worry in
children, threat rating and positive beliefs were excluded from future analyses.

Hypothesis Two: Cognitive development will predict scores on measures of
negative beliefs about worry, intolerance of uncertainty and negative problem
orientation.
Three regression equations, one for each of the cognitive variables, were used to
test this hypothesis. Because child age and all interpretations failed to correlate with
cognitive variables, only cognitive monitoring was used as a measure of cognitive
development. Recruitment site was entered in Block 1, and cognitive monitoring in Block
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2. Models I and 2 for intolerance of uncertainty were significant, F (1, 78) = 9.85,
p<.002, and F(2, 77) = 19.74,p<.001, respectively. Model 2 explained a total of33% of

the variance in intolerance of uncertainty. The models for negative problem orientation
were also significant,F(1, 78) = 6.67,p =.01,andF(2, 77)= 12.91,p<.001,
respectively, and explained 23% of the variance in negative problem orientation. In the
prediction of negative beliefs about worry, Modell failed to reach significance, F(I, 78)

= 3.96,p = .05, and Model 2 was significant, F(2, 77) = 19.79,p < .001, explaining 32%
of the variance in negative beliefs. Additional results are presented in Table 5. In
summary, monitoring predicted intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation,
and negative beliefs about worry and explained a significant portion of the variance in
each of the three variables.

Table 5.
Regressions Predicting IU, Negative Problem Orientation, and Negative Beliefs from
Cognitive Monitoring.

Dependent Variable
IV
t

NegProb.
t

Negative Beliefs
t

Block I
site

-3.14**

-2.58*

-1.99*

Block 2
site

-2.76**

-2.15*

-1.42

5.14**

4.21 **

5.83**

monitoring

Note. *p<.05; **p<.OOI
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Model assumptions were examined to determine the extent to which the models
might generalize to other samples. Linearity was assessed by examining scatter plots,
which indicated a roughly linear relationship between variables. Homescedasticity of
each variable was evaluated by examining the distribution of residuals. Multivariate
outliers were screened for by examining standardized residuals and influential cases
scanned for by using DFit, Cook's distance values, and Mahalanobis distances (where
large values are a concern). Standardized residuals for each of the three models were
normally distributed. Multicollinearity of each model was evaluated by examining the
variance inflation factor (VIF) (values> than 10 are problematic) and tolerance (values
<.1 are problematic). All VIFS and tolerance values were within acceptable limits.
Hypothesis Three: Intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation,
and negative beliefs about worry will predict child worry and cognitive development
will moderate the relation, such that advanced development is associated with
stronger predictive power of the cognitive variables.
Two sets of regressions were conducted to test this hypothesis, the first set using
child age as a moderator and the second with cognitive monitoring as a moderator.
Although child age failed to show a direct association with worry, it could be that the
relations between cognitive variables and worry are influenced by child age. To reduce
the number of overall tests and associated error, regression models were run for Penn
State Worry Questionnaire-Child scores only. Independent variables were centered before
calculating the interaction term in order to reduce multicollinearity.
For the first set of regressions, recruitment site was entered into Block 1, the
cognitive variable, child age, and the interaction in Block 2. Models are presented in
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Table 6. Block 1 and 2 of each model was significant, and the cognitive variable in each
equation was significant. Child age was significant only in predicting intolerance of
uncertainty. No interaction terms were significant.

78

Table 6.

Cognitive Variables, Cognitive Development, and the Interactions in the Prediction of
PSWQ-C Scores.
Intolerance of Uncertainty

Cognitive Monitoring

Child Age
t

~RSq.

Block 1

-2.97**

Site

~RSq.

6.91 * .08*
-2.63*

Block 2

8.85** .24**

Block 2

F

t

8.87** .12**

Block 1
Site

F

9.91 ** .26**

Site

-1.04

Site

-.93

Age

-2.18*

Monitor

1.51

IV

4.15**

IV

3.74**

Age* IV

.24

Monitor*IV

-.85

Negative Problem Orientation (NP)

Child Age

Cognitive Monitoring
t

~RSq.

t

Block 1

8.87** .12**

Block 1
Site

F

-2.98**

Site

-2.63*
11.09** .29**

Site

-1.45

Site

-1.24

Age

-1.35

Monitor

1.77

NP

4.35**

NP

4.09**

Age* NP

.95

Monitor*NP

-.37
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~RSq.

6.91 * .08*

Block 2

9.41 ** .25**

Block 2

F

Negative Beliefs(NB)

Cognitive Monitoring

Child Age

F

t

~RSq.

t

8.87** .12**

Block 1

Site

9.83** .26**

Block 2

-2.63*
10.24 ** .27**

Block 2

Site

-1.41

Site

-1.64

Age

-1.94

Monitor

1.19

NB

4.22**

NB

3.88**

Age* NB

1.30

~RSq.

6.91 * .08*

Block 1

-2.98**

Site

F

Monitor*NB -.18

Note. For child age models, df= (1, 68) for Block 1; df= (4,65) for Block 2
For cognitive monitoring models df = (1, 78) for Block I; df = (4, 75) for Block 2
*p<.05**p<.01

For the second set of regressions, cognitive monitoring was used as the measure
of cognitive development. In Block I recruitment site was entered, followed by the
cognitive variable, cognitive monitoring, and the interaction in Block 2. Results were
similar to analyses using child age and are presented in Table 8. Again, the cognitive
variable in each equation was significant, but no interaction terms were significant.
Cognitive monitoring was not a significant predictor in any equation.
Finally, an overall model was constructed to examine the relative predictive
power of each of the three cognitive variables. Again, recruitment site was entered in
Block 1 and all three cognitive variables in Block 2. Blocks I and 2 of the model were
significant, F(1, 78) = 6.91, p = .01 and F (4, 75) = 12.08, p<.OOI, respectively. The R
80

Square change value was significant,p<.OOI, and Model 2 explained 38% of the variance
in Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Child scores. Of the individual predictors, negative
beliefs about worry emerged as significant, t = 2.39,p

=

.02, and there was a trend

toward significance for negative problem orientation, t = 1.91,p = .06. IV was
nonsignificant, t = .73,p = .47. In summary, the three cognitive variables significantly
predicted worry but child age and cognitive monitoring did not moderate the association.
Negative beliefs about worry appeared to have the strongest association with worry when
the effects of negative problem orientation and intolerance of uncertainty were also
accounted for.
After each model, model assumptions were examined. Linearity and
homescedasticity were assessed by examining scatter plots of standardized residuals
against standardized predicted values. Inspection of the graphs revealed no violations of
the assumptions. Multivariate outliers were screened for by examining standardized
residuals and influential cases scanned for by using DFit, Cook's distance values, and
Mahalanobis distances (where large values are a concern). Standardized residuals for
each of the three models were normally distributed and multicollinearity did not appear to
be problematic, as all VIFs and tolerance values were within acceptable limits.

Hypothesis Four: Female children will report higher scores than male
children on measures of intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation,
negative beliefs about worry, and worry.
A series oft-tests was used to compare male and female children on the four
cognitive variables and the two measures of worry. Because sample sizes are unequal, the
pooled-variance estimate t-test was used. This test takes the different sample sizes into
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account by weighting the sample variances according to the sample size (Field, 2005).
The pooled variance was estimated using the following equation:

The pooled variance estimate is then replaced in the standard t statistic calculation, where
t:,. is the hypothesized difference between the two means, in this case 0:
~-x,-i1

t=

Gi( 1·+

1)

{s,\n; n2

To ensure equality of variances, Levene's test was conducted for each t-test and all were
nonsignificant. Means, standard deviations, and t statistics are presented in Table 7.
Results indicated that female children reported significantly higher levels of negative
problem orientation and negative beliefs about worry compared to male children.
Table 7.

Pooled Variance t-test Resultsfor Sex Differences on Cognitive Variables.
Males
M(SD)

Females
M(SD)

t

P

PSWQ-C

12.14 (7.87)

14.11 (5.98)

-1.21

ns

Worry/oversensitivity

5.00 (2.88)

6.37 (3.05)

-l.37 ns

luse

63.23 (18.66)

67.81 (2l.47)

-.41

NPO

13.89 (10.44)

17.49 (8.40)

-8.29 p<.OI

Positive Beliefs

8.44 (2.83)

8.99 (3.17)

-.15

Negative Beliefs

12.l7 (4.52)

14.22 (4.61)

-3.17 p<.OI

Note. df= 68, t> l.99 whenp. = .05
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Hypothesis Five. The cognitive variables of negative beliefs about worry,
intolerance of uncertainty, and negative problem orientation will predict group
membership of high and low worriers.
First, children were divided into high and low worry groups based on
worry/oversensitivity scores. This type of methodology has been used previously in other
studies to identify highly anxious children (Beidel & Turner, 1988; Mattison et aI., 1988;
Saurez & Bell-Dolan, 2001) and a cut score ofT> 60 has been shown to discriminate
clinical from nonclinical children (Mattison, Bagnato, & Brubaker, 1988). Using this cut
score, 43 children were classified as low worriers and 27 as high worriers. A binary
logistic regression was conducted with worry group as the dependent variable,
recruitment site entered into Block 1 and negative problem orientation, intolerance of
uncertainty, and negative beliefs entered into Block 2. Model 1 and Model 2 were
significantX(df= 4) = 15.85,p = .003 andX2(df=(7) = 45.67,p<.001, indicating that
both models resulted in a significant improvement in model prediction compared to the
initial model containing only the constant (predicting that all children are low worriers).
The Chi Square for Block 2 was significant,.x2 (df=3) = 29.83,p<.001, indicating that the
addition of the cognitive variables resulted in significant improvement over Block 1.
Overall, Model 2 accurately classified 87% of the children as high or low worriers,
compared to 71 % in Modell. Of the predictors in the model, the Wald statistics were
significant for recruitment site, Wald statistic = 5.47,p = .02, and intolerance of
uncertainty, Wald statistic = 4.86,p = .03., exp b = 1.07. The odds that a child is in the
high worry group increase by 1.07 for every 1 unit increase in intolerance of uncertainty.
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Exploratory analyses.

The current sample, although drawn from the community, included a greater than
expected proportion of highly worried children. Several studies have shown that
associations between variables differ based on the nature of the sample (community
versus clinical). Because a significant portion of the children in this study scored above a
clinical cut score (T>60 on the worry/oversensitivity scale), it could be that combining
these two groups (clinical worriers and average worriers) "washed out" significant
effects. To further examine this hypothesis, several analyses were conducted.
One of the most surprising results of the study was the lack of association
between child age and cognitive monitoring, given Bacow et al.'s (2009) finding that
monitoring increased with age in their clinically anxious sample of children. With
nonclinical adolescents, however, Cartwright-Hatton et al. (2004) found no relation
between monitoring and age. Thus, it was hypothesized that these relations might be
impacted by worry level. Partial correlations between age and monitoring were then
calculated for high and low worry groups separately. Results showed significant but
inverse correlations depending on worry group. For low worriers, cognitive monitoring
decreased with child age (r = -.59, p<.OO I, n = 31), while for high worriers monitoring
increased with age (r = .50, P = .02,n = 19). This relation is depicted graphically in
Figure 3. It may be then, that cognitive monitoring is not a measure of cognitive
development, but is better conceptualized as a cognitive variable more similar to
intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, or negative beliefs about worry.
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Figure 3. Relationship between child age and cognitive monitoring by
worry group. High and low worry groups defined with a cut score of T> 60
on the worry/oversensitivity scale

Based on these results, it was hypothesized that worry group would moderate the
relation between child age and the othe~ cognitive variables. Hypothesis two was
therefore re-tested. Recruitment site, child age, worry group, and the interaction were
entered into each equation. Regressions were conducted with recruitment site, age, worry
group, and the age x group interaction as independent variables and intolerance of
uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs as the dependent
variables. Results are presented in Table 8. For significant interactions, slope values were
calculated for each group and graphed. See Figures 4, 5, and 6 for graphs of interactions.
The model for intolerance of uncertainty was significant, F (4, 65) = 13.54,p < .001, but
no individual predictors were significant. The models for negative problem orientation,
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F(4, 65) = 8.41,p<.0001, and negative beliefs, F(4, 65) = 8.09,p < .001, were significant.
The interaction terms in both models were also significant. To further understand the
correlations between child age and cognitive monitoring and the effect of worry group, a
model was also constructed for cognitive monitoring. This model was also significant, (4,
65) = 6.08,p < .00l.
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Table 8.
Regression Equations Predicting Cognitive Variables from Worry Group and Child Age.
WOITYGrou~

Interaction
R2
.02

IV

t

Site

-1.69

Age

-.98

Worry group

-.75

Age*Worry group

1.34

N eeative Problem
Site

.05*

-2.58*

Worry group

-1.82

Age*Worry group

2.23*

.06*

b
.36

b
6.19

-2.19*

2.38

-.67

1.95*

-1.33**

2.21 *

-1.05

Age

-2.41 *

Worry group

-2.03*

Age*Worry group

2.45*

Monitorine
Site

High

-.96

Age

Neeative Beliefs
Site

Low

.14**
-.98

Age

-3.83**

Worry group

-3.36**

Age*Worry group

3.56**

Note. *p<.05; =**p<.OI

87

25
c

.g

20

III

~

C

<II
.;:

o 15

E
:ii

~<II 10

l~======::::::::::~~~
-

<II

>
·z
III

til)

<II

-

High Worry

-

Low Worry"

5

Z

0
00

~

cq

N

00

00

0'\

\.0

cri

0

.-4

q

00

6 6
.-4

.-4

~

~

.-4
.-4

.-4
.-4

N
.-4

Child Age
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Because worry group moderated the relation between child age and the cognitive
variables and, in tum, cognitive variables were hypothesized to predict worry, it seemed
reasonable to next examine if the predictive power of the cognitive variables

w~s

also

affected by worry group. That is, are the associations between the cognitive variables and
worry also moderated by worry group? Three regression equations were conducted to
predict Penn State Worry Questionnaire-Child scores, with recruitment site, the cognitive
variable, worry group, and the interaction. Results presented in Table 9. The overall
models for all three cognitive variables were significant, but an examination of individual
predictors showed that negative beliefs and negative problem orientation significantly
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predicted worry, while intolerance of uncertainty did not. No interaction terms were
significant.
Table 9.

Predicting PSWQ-C Scores from Cognitive Variables and Worry Group.
Worry Group
Low
High
Cognitive
Variable
IV

Interaction
t

Site

-1.36

IV

1.91

Group

1.82

Group*IU

-1.28

Negative Problem
Site

-1.30

NP

2.29*

Group

2.19*

Group*NP

-1.26

Negative Beliefs
Site

-1.25

NB

1.99"

Group

1.77

Group*NB

-1.04

R2
.02

F
8.59**

b
.13*

b
.02

.01

10.94**

.36**

.15

.01

10.10**

.64**

.30

Note. df= 4, 65 for overall models; *p<.05; **p<.Ol; "=.05
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DISCUSSION

The current study examined worry and related cognition in a community sample
of school aged children. First, preliminary analyses were conducted to investigate the
validity of several measures, including a shortened version ofthe COELE, a measure of
negative problem orientation adapted for children, and a measure of children's ability to
generate mUltiple possible outcomes to a neutral scenario. Next, several paths from a
larger conceptual model proposed to explain cognitive processes related to worry in
children were tested. Hypotheses related to the power of threat interpretation, intolerance
of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry to predict
worry in children were tested. It was also hypothesized that cognitive development would
moderate the association between the cognitive variables and worry, such that increasing
development would be associated with stronger predictive power of the cognitive
variables. Hypothesized sex differences in cognitive variables and worry were also
examined. Finally, the utility of the cognitive variables in discriminating high from low
worry groups was examined.

Preliminary analyses.
The shortened version of the COELE did not relate to other measures as expected
and its psychometric properties were generally weak. Surprisingly, threat interpretation
and threat ratings were not associated with worry. This was unexpected given the large
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body of work linking worry and threat interpretation using other measures of threat
interpretation (Bogels, Snieder, & Kindt, 2003; Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, &
Dalgleish, 2000). Results from this study also failed to replicate those of Saurez and BellDolan (2001), who using the original COELE, showed that worry correlated positively
with interpretations of ambiguous stories, threat and worry ratings for both stories, and
likelihood ratings. Although the COELE reportedly has strong psychometric properties,
the original validation study is the only known study to date to use the measure. It may be
that relations in the initial examination are specific to that sample and do not generalize
well to other groups. It could also be that the adaptation of the interview from 12 to 6
stories used in this study affected the measure's validity. A basic analysis of the measure
psychometrics indicated low internal consistency of the scales and several scales failed to
correlate with worry measures, suggesting that validity may have been affected. The
telephone administration of the interview may have also influenced responses and
measure psychometrics. Children may have been distracted during the interview, which
would have interfered with their attention, processing of the information, and verbal
responses.
The measure of negative problem orientation adapted for children from the Social
Problem Solving Inventory showed promising psychometric properties. Although a full
examination of the measure's psychometrics is beyond the scope of the present study,
preliminary estimates of internal consistency were adequate and the measure correlated
with other variables as expected. Future studies aimed more specifically at examining the
psychometrics of the measure would be beneficial. Specifically, work including sample
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sizes adequate for a factor analysis and an examination of test-retest reliability would
provide additional support for use of the adapted SPSI with children.
Initial examination of the measure of children's ability to generate multiple
possible outcomes for a neutral scenario showed no association with other measures of
cognitive development, including both child age and cognitive monitoring. This suggests
that the measure is not an adequate marker of cognitive development for this age range. It
may be that these skills emerge earlier in life and are fully developed by age 8 years. If
this is the case, from age 8 years on the ability to consider multiple possible future
outcomes is relatively stable across development. It has been hypothesized that children's
ability to generate multiple possible negative events is associated with the ability to
catastrophize, or elaborate on threat (Ellis & Hudson, 2010; Vasey, 1993), and that this
ability increases with development and is related to worry. Future work should determine
if this ability is related to cognitive development in younger children.

Hypothesis Testing.
First, the association between the three cognitive development measures was
examined. Generally, the measures were not correlated. Cognitive monitoring and child
age also failed to correlate with one another. This was somewhat surprising given that
others have found a positive association between the two variables (Bacow et aI., 2009).
This finding is explained, however, by post-hoc exploratory analyses revealing that worry
group influenced directionality of the correlations, washing out the results when groups
were combined. When high and low worry groups were examined separately, age was
associated with increases in cognitive monitoring in the high worry group but decreases
in the low worry group. It seems then, that for typical or low worry children, attention to
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thoughts decreases over time while it increases over time for worried children. Worried
children may be hypervigilant to their thoughts, scanning for potential danger both
internally and externally, and this increases over time. In contrast, typical children are
less likely to be excessively attentive to internal stimuli and engage in less monitoring
over time. It may be that cognitive monitoring serves as a maintaining factor in the worry
process. In the future it will be important to determine the directionality of the relations,
specifically if vigilance precedes worry or is a consequence of it, which cannot be
determined from the current study.
The hypothesis that the three cognitive development measures would correlate
positively with worry-related cognition was only partially supported and varied by
measure. Cognitive monitoring showed positive correlations with intolerance of
uncertainty, negative beliefs about worry, negative problem orientation, and both
measures of worry. Age failed to correlate with any of the worry related cognitive e
variables and correlated negatively with worry when measured with the Penn State Worry
Questionnaire-Child. It was somewhat surprising that child age correlated negatively with
worry, given previous work suggesting increases or no difference with age (Chorpita et
aI., 1997; Muris et aI., 2001). The all possible interpretations variable did not correlate
with any of the worry related cognitive variables or with either measure of worry. The
failure of the all possible interpretations measure to correlate with either measure of
worry has important implications for our understanding of worry in children. This result
suggests that children's ability to generate multiple possible explanations, whether
negative or neutral, for an ambiguous event is not related to worry in children. This runs
counter to the current definition of worry, which describes worry as a stream or chain of
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internal content depicting multiple threatening scenarios. This result also fails to support
the hypothesis that the ability to generate possible outcomes increases with child age and
allows a child to worry in a generalized way (Ellis & Hudson, 2010; Vasey, 1993). For
school age children imagining one possible threatening outcome may be sufficient to
worry, raising the possibility that children are not worrying in the way that adults worry.
It could be that children's worry involves greater focus on one particular threat rather

than the chain of multiple negative outcomes that characterizes adult worry. Future work
designed to test this hypothesis and to better understand the nature of children's worry
would be beneficial.
There was also a significant interaction between cognitive development, as
measured by child age, and worry group in the prediction of intolerance of uncertainty,
negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry. Exploratory analyses
showed that worry group moderated the relation between child age and two cognitive
variables, with decreases in negative problem orientation with age for the low worry
group and increases in negative beliefs about worry with age for the high worry group.
Comer et al. (2009) found a similar pattern for intolerance of uncertainty in their sample
of children, such that intolerance of uncertainty decreased with child age in a community
sample but not a sample of children with anxiety disorders. The authors suggest that
typical development is marked by an increased ability to tolerate uncertainty, a skill that
fails to develop in children with clinical levels of anxiety (Comer, 2009). Similarly,
learning adaptive ways of viewing problems and worry itself might also mark typical
development. Results from this study indicate, however, that highly worried children
experience an increase in negative problem orientation with child age and fail to
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experience the decrease in negative beliefs about worry seen in children with lower levels
of worry.
Because directionality of the associations cannot be determined based on the
study's design, there are two ways of interpreting these findings. First, it could be that
worry interferes with the typical trajectory of worry related cognition that most children
experience over time. For typical children, worry is likely infrequent, relatively short
lived, and not particularly upsetting. Over time, as children experience worry as transient
and nonthreatening, beliefs about uncertainty, problems, and worry itself become more
balanced and adaptive. Children who experience excessive worry, however, may be
more likely to find worry distressing because it is frequent, interferes with their lives, and
is accompanied by physical symptoms. The

expe~ence

of such worry might in turn

interfere with children's development of rational appraisals of worry (e.g., worry is
unwanted, dangerous, and unpleasant) and situations that might trigger a worry response,
such as facing a problem or ambiguity.
An alternative explanation for the findings is that the directionality is reversed, so
that deviations from the typical trajectory of worry related cognition increases the
likelihood of worry. In particular, lacking confidence in problem solving skills might
contribute to feelings of incompetence, increasing the likelihood of engaging in worry
rather than proactive coping in the face of uncertainty or a problem. It could also be that
parents playa role in facilitating the development of these cognitions in their children.
Given the familial nature of anxiety, it is likely that anxious children have anxious
parents. Anxious parents might embody these negative thinking styles and be unable to
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model more adaptive ways of viewing uncertainty, problems, and the experience of worry
itself for their children.
The hypothesis that cognitive variables would be associated with worry was
largely supported. Intolerance of uncertainty, negative beliefs about worry, and negative
problem orientation correlated positively with worry, while positive beliefs did not.
These results were consistent with other work which has shown positive associations
between intolerance of uncertainty and worry (Comer et aI., 2009), and negative beliefs
and worry (Bacow et aI., 2009) in children. This is the first known study to examine
problem orientation and worry in children, but based on work with adults and
adolescents, the positive relation between the two was as expected (Laugesen, Dugas, &
Bukowski, 2003; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005). Positive beliefs, however, were not
correlated with worry in this sample, in line with previous results in a sample of both
clinical and non-clinical children (Bacow et aI., 2009) and adolescents (CartwrightHatton et aI., 2004). However, the current findings contradict other work with adults
(Davey, Tallis, & Capuzzo, 1996) and findings from Laugesen, Dugas, and Bukowski
(2003), who showed that positive beliefs about worry explained substantial variance in
worry scores in a community sample of adolescents. This suggests that worry's
association with positive beliefs may not emerge until later in life and are not relevant for
young children. Future work should examine positive beliefs as a maintaining factor in
chronic worry.
As expected, intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and
negative beliefs about worry significantly predicted Penn State Worry QuestionnaireChild scores. Of the three predictors, negative beliefs about worry emerged as the
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strongest. Cognitive development did not moderate the predictive power of the cognitive
variables, indicating that the variables are significantly related to worry regardless of
developmental level (as measured by child age and cognitive monitoring). This suggests
that children as young as age eight years old experience intolerance of uncertainty,
negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry, and that these thoughts
predict worry in much the same way they do in adults. Contrary to hypotheses, advanced
development is not associated with higher scores on measures of the cognitive variables,
and worry's relation with intolerance of uncertainty, negative beliefs about worry, and
negative problem orientation did not differ statistically across development. Further,
exploratory analyses showed that the predictive power of the cognitive variables held
constant across worry group. It seems then, that the set of cognitive variables are related
to worry in the same way, across worry level and cognitive development.
This finding has important implications for treatment and prevention of worry in
children. Because many of the same cognitive processes associated with worry in adults
appear to be at work in worried children, adapting adult treatment protocols to
developmentally appropriate levels may be effective intervention tools. For example,
metacognitive therapy, focused on modifying negative beliefs about worry, has recently
been shown to be effective in samples of adults with anxiety disorders (Wells & King,
2006). The finding that similar processes are involved in high and low worry groups also
suggests that programs designed to prevent the development of excessive worry may also
be advantageous. Intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative
beliefs are associated with worry, even at normal levels, and so would be accessible for
all children. Learning skills to modify these beliefs and tolerate uncertainty may help
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children cope with worry and prevent at risk children from developing clinical problems
in the future. Future work is needed with clinically anxious children, however, and
studies should examine if associations between these variables are also similar across
clinically anxious and nonanxious children.
Exploratory analyses revealed a complex relation between cognitive monitoring,
worry, and cognitive variables. Results from previous studies examining the relation
between cognitive monitoring and worry severity have shown that nonclinical children
reported higher levels of monitoring compared to clinical children (Bacow et aI., 2009), a
finding that has been documented with adolescents as well (Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).
Exploratory analyses accounting for the effects of both clinical severity and child age
hinted at developmental trends in cognitive monitoring that were impacted by worry
severity. In the low worry group, the tendency to monitor thoughts decreases with child
age, a pattern also seen with intolerance of uncertainty (although not significant
statistically), negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry. It seems
logical that the ability to recognize thoughts would follow a similar pattern to the other
cognitive variables, as awareness of thoughts would necessarily precede evaluations
(including intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs
about worry) of them. Typical development may include an ability to disengage from
thoughts, a skill that is underdeveloped or interfered with by severe worry. Bacow et al
(2009) suggests that increased awareness of thoughts may not be sufficient to lead to
anxiety problems. However, it may be a necessary prerequisite for the set of negative
cognitions that explain significant variance in worry in children.
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Results for the effect of sex on worry and worry related cognition were mixed.
The current study found no differences between male and female children on Penn State
Worry Questionnaire-Child or worry/oversensitivity scores. Previous work has not shown
any difference consistently, with some studies reporting higher worry in females while
others report no difference (Chorpita et aI., 1997; Muris et aI., 2001; Reynolds &
Richmod, 1978).
Male and female children differed significantly on two cognitive variables, with
female children reporting higher levels of negative beliefs about worry and negative
problem orientation. Previous work with children showed no sex differences in positive
beliefs, negative beliefs, or cognitive monitoring in children (Bacow et aI., 2009) or
adolescents (Cartwright-Hatton, 2004), although work with community samples of adults
has shown higher levels of negative problem orientation in women (D'Zurilla, MaydeuOlivares, & Kant, 1998; Robichaud, Dugas, & Conway, 2003).
Several explanations for sex effects have been proposed. Robichaud et ai. (2003)
hypothesized that women's negative problem orientation could be related to their
increased feelings of powerlessness, perceived inability to control problems, and lack of
confidence in their coping abilities. Similarly, Stavosky and Borkovec (1987) suggest
that women (and girls) may adopt worry as a problem solving skill, as it reflects a more
traditional feminine role. That is, worry is a less instrumental and assertive way to solve a
problem, a style stereotypically associated with femininity. The authors also suggest that
women might be encouraged to adopt these strategies for coping with problems, rather
than a more aggressive or confrontational approach, and receive reinforcement for using
them. Further, women might not be exposed to alternative problem solving strategies.
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Stavosky and Borkovec (1987) strongly advocate for the idea that the effects of
biological sex and gender role identification be separated. For example, Green (1980, as
cited in Stavosky & Borkovec, 1987) found differences in adolescent depression based on
gender role identification but not sex. Specifically, feminine or undifferentiated gender
role identification was associated with depression. Future work might consider social and
environmental factors that contribute to children's perceptions that problems and
uncertainty are threatening, overwhelming, and intolerable and that worry is an internal
experience to be fearful of.
Results from this study supported the final hypothesis, indicating that the
cognitive variables distinguished between high and low worriers. Intolerance of
uncertainty, negative beliefs about worry, and negative problem orientation successfully
predicted whether children fell above or below the clinical cut score on the
worry/oversensitivity scale, and the model overall accurately classified 87% of children.
Of the cognitive variables, only intolerance of uncertainty made a significant contribution
to the prediction. This result is similar to that of Laugesen et al. (2003) who showed that
intolerance of uncertainty and negative problem orientation, but not positive beliefs or
cognitive avoidance, accurately discriminated moderate from high worriers in a
community sample of adolescents. Similarly, Cartwright-Hatton et at. (2004) showed that
adolescents with emotional disorders endorsed more negative beliefs about worry
compared to nonclinical adolescents, but not more positive beliefs or cognitive
monitoring. Of note, however, Bacow et al. (2009) failed to find differences between
children with anxiety disorders and groups on negative beliefs about worry. More work is
needed in establishing consistent relations between these variables.
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Implications for a conceptual model.
Results from this study have important implications for the conceptual model
proposed earlier. Support for the paths between worry and intolerance of uncertainty,
negative beliefs about worry, and negative problem orientation was found in children as
young as age eight years. Although support for threat interpretation was not found in this
study, caution should be used when interpreting these results. A large body of literature
has supported the association between information processing and worry in children and
it seems most likely that the lack of significant results in this study are unique to the
sample or to the methodology used (namely shortening the COELE interview used by
Saurez & Bell-Dolan, 2001). This study also suggests that positive beliefs about worry
are not particularly relevant to worry in children between the ages of 8 and 12 years old.
The influence of cognitive development on worry related variables appears to differ as a
function of worry severity, suggesting that it will be important to account for the
influence of worry severity in future models of worry in children.
Limitations of the current study.
Although this study has a number of strengths, it is also bound by some
limitations. First, the nature of the sample undoubtedly affected the results of this study.
The sample was not drawn at random, and although a community sample, the group was
biased toward high levels of worry, as evidenced by the average Penn State Worry Child
Questionnaire-Child and worry/oversensitivity scores. Children who experience higher
levels of worry (or their parents, or both) may have been more likely to participate in the
study because it was personally relevant to them. Results may be better understood as
coming from two distinct populations including a highly worried group and a more
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typical group, rather than from the same population. Exploratory analyses including
worry group as moderator support this idea. However, there are also implications for
splitting the sample into two smaller groups. First, differences may exist that the current
analyses were not able to detect due to limited sample size and resulting power. Second,
results may be specific to this sample and may not generalize to other groups. Future
work should further test these associations to cross-validate findings from this study.
A second limitation related to power is the relatively small number of male
children, which may have restricted the ability to find differences based on child sex.
Prevalence differences between males and females in worry and GAD may in fact have
contributed to potential sampling bias, as worried children are more likely to be female.
A larger sample size with equal numbers of male and female children could have better
answered questions about sex differences in worry and related cognitive variables.
Third, the unequal distribution across the age range, especially at the low and high
ends, limited power in analyses dealing with child age. Although equal numbers of
children from all ages were invited to participate, no seven-year-old children returned
completed packets. Most likely the amount of material was overwhelming for children at
that reading level, although all measures but one (the SPSI-Child Adaptation) have been
validated for children of that age. Because most children were aged 9 and 10 years, there
may not have been sufficient variability to detect differences related to cognitive
development.
Finally, the cross-sectional design of the study prevents any directional or causal
conclusions. Associations between cognitive development, the cognitive variables, and
worry are complex and appear to change as s function of worry severity. In particular, the
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finding that child age is associated with increases in intolerance of uncertainty, negative
beliefs about worry, and negative problem orientation in the high worry group should be
examined longitudinally.

Summary and future directions.
In summary, it appears that a cognitive model of worry can be applied to children
as young as eight years old. Intolerance of uncertainty, negative beliefs about worry and
negative problem orientation appear to be closely associated with worry in this sample,
while positive beliefs about worry are not. Specifically, negative beliefs about worry
demonstrated the strongest association with continuous worry measures while intolerance
of uncertainty was the strongest predictor of high and low worry group. The role of
information processing is less clear based on this study, and further work is needed in this
area. Cognitive development appears to influence worry related cognition as a function of
worry severity, where typical development is marked by a decrease in intolerance of
uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and negative beliefs about worry. Overall,
results from this study suggest that intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem
orientation, and negative beliefs about worry significantly predict worry in children,
regardless of child age or worry level, and negative problem orientation and intolerance
of uncertainty have especially strong associations with worry.
This study makes an important contribution to a complex and, at times,
contradictory literature. Future work could disentangle the complicated relations between
cognitive development, worry, and cognitive variables in several ways. Understanding
worry in children must account for a number of variables that could alter or moderate
relations between variables, including but not limited to child sex, age, and worry

104

severity. Emerging evidence suggests that each of these variables influences the
directionality and/or strength of association between worry and related variables, and
drawing conclusions at this time is difficult due to what appears to be inconsistent
findings across studies. Future work should account for potential moderators in order to
contribute to the literature in a way that allows for comparisons across studies. What
appear to be contradictory findings might be due to the use of samples of different ages or
worry severity level. Other conflicting findings might be explained by the study design
and more specifically which cognitive variables are included in the analyses. To date,
studies of worry in children have examined a single cognitive variable and its association
with worry. Including more than one cognitive variable in the study design helps to
distinguish which variables are most important relative to the other variables. Future
work designed to account for relations between these variables and their association with
worry will be important in clearly identifying the most relevant cognitive variables.
In addition, cognitive models should be tested in children younger than age eight
years. To date no studies have examined a comprehensive model in children aged seven
years or younger. Measures of intolerance of uncertainty and metacognition have been
validated for use with children seven years old; however no known studies have
examined the kind of comprehensive cognitive model tested here. In addition, developing
other valid assessment measures of children's worry related cognition, beyond child selfreport, would allow for the investigation of these constructs in eve younger children.
Understanding the lower limit for the applicability of these models has important
implications for treatment. If, as has been demonstrated in this study and others, cognitive
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variables are strongly associated with worry in children, targeted interventions aimed at
altering these thoughts could be beneficial in treatment.
Relatedly, longitudinal studies would clarify issues related to the temporal
relations between cognitive variables, worry, and cognitive development. Studies
designed to understand issues of timing, such as when these cognitions develop, how they
become problematic, and their sequential relation with worry will be especially important
in the creation of prevention and treatment programs in youth.
Additional work is also needed to test the applicability of this model to clinical
samples of children. Although the current sample had a substantial proportion of
clinically worried children, the model should be tested with children recruited from an
anxiety clinic and in those diagnosed with GAD. Such a model could then be used to
devise GAD and worry specific interventions for use in treating children.
Finally, the influence of parenting on the relevant cognitive variables should also
be examined in the future. Cognitive variables have demonstrated a predictive relation to
worry in children ages 8 to 12 years. Understanding how such beliefs about worry,
uncertainty, and problems develop in children could inform prevention and intervention
efforts. One likely source of influence is parents and family environment factors.
Examining parental beliefs and specific parenting behaviors could help us to understand
how children develop negative thinking styles and ultimately guide prevention and
treatment efforts.
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Children's Opinions of Everyday Life Events
Interview
Story #l--Your mother usually gets home from work around 5:30 PM. One afternoon
while you are watching TV, the phone rings at 6:30 PM and you realize your mom is not
home yet. What do you think has happened?

1. How would you feel if this happened to you?
not at all
a little
somewhat
123
Worried
123
Sad
2. How scary is this situation for you?
1
2
3
not at all
a little
somewhat
3. How likely do you think this is to happen to you?

very much
4
4

extremely
5
5

4

5
extremely

very much

123

4

not at all

very much

a little

somewhat

5
extremely

Story #2-0ne of your close friends tells you that another one of your friends is having a
birthday party next Saturday. Your friend received a special invitation in the mail and
you have not received one. What do you think has happened?

1. How would you feel if this happened to you?
not at all
a little
somewhat
Worried
123
123
Sad

2. How scary is this situation for you?
1
2
3
not at all
a little
somewhat
3. How likely do you think this is to happen to you?

123

very much
4
4

extremely
5
5

4
very much

5
extremely

4
5
not at all
a little
somewhat
very much
extremely
Story #3-0ne day before starting the lesson, your teacher asks you to stay after class.
What do you think has happened?

1. How would you feel if this happened to you?

126

Worried
Sad

not at all
1
1

a little
2
2

2. How scary is this situation for you?
1
2
not at all
a little

somewhat
3
3

3
somewhat

3. How likely do you think this is to happen to you?
1
2
3
not at all
a little
somewhat

very much
4
4

4

very much

4

very much

extremely
5
5

5
extremely

5
extremely

Story #4-- While you are trying to go to sleep, you hear loud voices in your parents'
bedroom. Your dad is yelling at your mom and she screams back at him. What do you
think has happened?

1. How would you feel if this happened to you?
not at all
a little
somewhat
Worried
1 2 3
1 2 3
Sad

very much
4
4

extremely
5
5

2. How scary is this situation for you?
1
2
4
3
5
not at all
a little
somewhat
very much
extremely
3. How likely do you think this is to happen to you?
1 2 3
4
5
not at all
a little
somewhat
very much
extremely
Story #5-0n the first day of summer camp, some kids are talking and when you
approach them you overhear them saying mean things about you. What do you think has
happened?

1. How would you feel if this happened to you?
not at all
a little
somewhat
Worried
1 2 3
Sad
1 2 3
2. How scary is this situation for you?
1
2
3
not at all
a little
somewhat
3. How likely do you think this is to happen to you?
127

4
4

extremely
5
5

4
very much

5
extremely

very much

1

not at all

2
a little

3
somewhat

4

5

very much

extremely

Story #6-Your English teacher asks you to read a paragraph in front of the class. In the
middle of your reading, the teacher tells you "Sit down, that's wrong" and asks someone
else to continue reading. What do you think has happened?

1. How would you feel if this happened to you?
not at all
a little
somewhat
Worried
123
123
Sad
2. How scary is this situation for you?
1
2
3
not at all
a little
somewhat
3. How likely do you think this is to happen to you?

very much

extremely

4

5
5

4

4

very much

5
extremely

123

4

5

not at all

very much

extremely

a little

somewhat
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PSWQ-C
Directions. This form is about worrying. Worrying happens when you are scared about something and you
think about it a lot. People sometimes worry about school, their family, their health, things coming up in
the future, or other kids of things. For each sentence that you read, circle the answer that best tells how true
that sentence is about you.
1. My worries really bother me.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

2. I don't really worry about things.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

3. Many things make me worry.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

4. I know I shouldn't worry about things, but
just can't help it.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

5. When I am under pressure, I worry a lot.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

6. I am always worrying about something.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

7. I find it easy to stop worrying when I want.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

8. When I finish one thing, I start to worry
about everything else.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

9. I never worry about anything.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

10. I've been a worrier all my life.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

11. I notice that II have been worrying about
things.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

12. Once I start worrying, I can't stop.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

13. I worry all the time.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true

14. I worry about things until they are done.

never
true

sometimes
true

most times
true

always
true
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RCMAS
Read each question carefully. Put a circle around the word YES if you think it is true
about you. Put a circle around the word NO if you think it is not true about you.
1. I have trouble making up my mind.
2. I get nervous when things do not go the right way for me.
3. Others seem to do things easier than I can.
4. I like everyone I know.
5. Often I have trouble getting my breath.
6. I worry a lot of the time.
7. I am afraid of a lot of things.
8. I am always kind.
9. I get mad easily.
10. I worry about what my parents will say to me.
11. I feel that others do not like the way I do things.
12. I always have good manners.
13. It is hard for me to get to sleep at night.
14. I worry about what other people think about me.
15. I feel alone even when there are people with me.
16. I am always good.
17. Often I feel sick in my stomach.
18. My feelings get hurt easily.
19. My hands feel sweaty.
20. I am always nice to everyone.
21. I am tired a lot.
22. I worry about what is going to happen.
23. Other children are happier than I.
24. I tell the truth every single time.
25. I have bad dreams.
26. My feelings get hurt easily when I am fussed at.
27. I feel someone will tell me I do things the wrong way.
28. I never get angry.
29. I wake up scared some of the time.
30. I worry when I go to bed at night.
31. It is hard for me to keep my mind on my schoolwork.
32. I never say things I shouldn't.
33. I wiggle in my seat a lot.
34. I am nervous.
35. A lot of people are against me.
36. I never lie.
37. I often worry about something bad happening to me.
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YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

SPSI-R (Child Adaptation)
You are going to read some sentences about how people might think, feel, and act when
they have important problems in their life. I'm not talking about everyday problems. The
kinds of problems I am talking about are important in your life that bother you, but you
don't know right away how to change it or how to make it stop bothering you. You know
you have a problem when you feel puzzled, stumped, uncertain, or confused about
something. You will read each statement and decide which number tells how true the
statement is about you. Then circle the number. Remember not to skip any!
How true is the statement about you?

o - not at all true
1- a little true
2 -medium amount true
3- very much true
4 - extremely true
1. I worry too much about things instead of trying to fix them.

o

1

234

2. I feel afraid when I have a big problem to solve.

o

1

234

3. When I have a big choice to make I feel scared and not sure that I can do it.

o

1

234

4. Sometimes I can't solve a problem at first. Then I think that in try hard and don't give
up I will solve the problem later.

o

1

234

5. When I have a problem, most of the time I think there is a way to fix it.

o

1

2

3

4

6. I wait for problems to go away before I try to fix them.

o

1

234

7. In can't solve a problem right away, I get angry and feel stuck.

o

1

2

3

4

8. When I have a big problem to solve, I feel like I can't fix it no matter how hard I try.

o

1

2

3

4

9. When I have a problem, I put off trying to solve it for as long as I can.

o

1

2

3

4

10. I try hard not to deal with problems in my life.

o

1

234

11. Hard problems in my life make me very upset.

o

1

2

3

4
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12. When I have a problem in my life I try to solve it head on.

o

1

2

3

4

13. I try not to think about problems instead of trying to fix them.

o

1

234

14. I believe that I can fix a problem with no help if! keep trying hard.

o

1

234

15. I put off problems until it is too late.

o

1

234

16. I spend more time trying to stay away from my problems than trying to fix them.

o

1

234

17. When I try to fix a problem I get so upset that it's hard to think.

o

1

234

18. I hate solving problems in my life.

o

123

4

19. I try to see problems as a way to learn something new.

o

1

2

3

4

20. I feel sad and stuck when I have a big problem to solve.

o

1

234

21. When I have a big problem, I ask someone to help me solve it.

o

1

234

22. When I can't fix a problem on my first try, I get sad and give up.

o

1

234
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IUSC
How well do these statements describe you? Please answer questions #1 through #27
with this scale.

1
Not at all

2

3
Somewhat

1. Doubts stop me from having strong opinions.
1 2 3

4

5

Very much

4

5

2. Being unsure means that a person is mixed-up.
2 3 4
1

5

3. Not knowing what will happen in the future makes life hard.
1
2
3
4

5

4. It's not fair that we can't predict the future.
1 2 3

5

4

5. I can't relax if! don't know what will happen tomorrow.
1
2
3
4

5

6. Not knowing what will happen in the future makes me uneasy, anxious or stressed.
2 3 4
5
1
7. Surprise events upset me greatly.
1 2 3

4

5

8. It frustrates me to not have all of the information I need.
1 2 3 4 5
9. Not knowing what could happen keeps me from enjoying life.
3 4 5
1
2
10. One should always think ahead to avoid surprises.
2 3 4
1

5

11. Plans can be ruined by things you didn't think would happen.
3 4 5
1
2
12. When it is time to do things, not knowing what could happen keeps me from acting.
2 3 4
5
1
13. Being unsure of things means that I am not great.
2 3 4
1
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5

How well do these statements describe you?

123
Not at all

4

Somewhat

5

Very much

14. When I am not sure of something I can't go forward.
1 2 3 4 5
15. When I am not sure of something I can't work very well.
1 2 3 4 5
16. Other kids have less doubts than I do.
1 2 3

4

5

17. Not knowing what will happen makes me unhappy or sad.
1 2 3 4 5
18. I always want to know what will happen to me in the future.
1 2 3 4 5
19. I don't like being taken by surprise.
1 2 3

4

5

20. The smallest doubt can keep me from doing things.
1 2 3 4 5
21. I should be able to prepare for everything in advance.
1 2 3 4 5
22. Being unclear about things means that I am not confident.
1 2 3 4 5
23. It's not fair that other kids are more sure of things.
1 2 3 4 5
24. Not knowing what can happen keeps me from sleeping well.
1
2
3
4

5

25. I must get away from all situations where I don't know what will happen.
1 2 3 4 5
26. Things that are unclear stress me.
1 2 3
4
5
27. I don't like being undecided about the future.
2 3 4
1
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5

MCQC
We are interested in how young people think. Listed below are a number of beliefs that
people have. Please read each item and say how much you generally agree with by
circling a number. Please respond to all the items. There are no right or wrong answers.

Do not
agree

Agree
slightly

Agree

Agree very
moderately much

123

4

1. If! worry about things now, I will have fewer problems in the future.

123

4

2. It is not a good idea to worry because worrying is bad for me.

123

4

3. I often notice the thoughts I have in my head.

123

4

4. If I worry a lot, I could make myself sick.
1

234

5. When I am thinking about a problem in my head, I take note of how my mind works.

123

4

6. If I did not get a worry thought out of my head and then something bad happened, it
would be my fault.
123
4
7. Worrying about things helps me to be organized and keep my stuff in order.
123
4

8. My worrying thoughts keep going, no matter how hard I try to put them out of my
head.
1
2
3
4
9. When I am confused, worrying helps me sort things out.
123
4
10. I can't stop thinking ofthe things that I worry about.

1

234

11. I try hard to keep track of the thoughts that I have in my head.
1
234
12. I should be able to tell myself to stop and start thinking about things whenever I want
to.
1

2

3

4
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Do not
agree
1

Agree
slightly
2

Agree

Agree very
moderately much

3

4

13. Worrying might make me go crazy.
1 2 3

4

14. I am always thinking about the thoughts in my head.
1 2 3
4
15. I pay a lot of attention to the way I think.
1 2 3

4

16. Worrying helps me feel better.
1 2 3

4

17. If I can't stop my thoughts, I am no good.
1 2 3

4

18. Once I start worrying about something, I cannot stop.
1 2 3
4
19. If! can't stop my thoughts, bad things will happen.
1 2 3
4
20. Worrying helps me solve problems.
1

2'

3

4

21. It is bad to think about certain things.
1 2 3

4

22. If! couldn't be in control of what I think, I would fall apart.
1
2 3 4
23. I need to worry in order to get my work done.
1 2 3

4

24. I think about my thoughts over and over.
1 2 3

4
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Poster at the Annual Behavior and Cognitive Therapies Convention, November
15-18, Philadelphia, PA.
Zurlage, M., Kertz, S. J, Chapman, L.K., Woodruff-Borden. (2007). Fathers'
Psychological Control and Acceptance as a Mediator and Moderator ofAnxiety •
Poster at the Annual Behavior and Cognitive Therapies Convention, November
15-18, Philadelphia, PA.
Ballash, N., Kertz, S. J., Zurlage, M., Chapman, L. K., Woodruff-Borden, J. (2007). A
Developmental Analysis of Maternal Control in the Etiology ofAnxiety. Poster at
the Annual American Psychological Association Convention, August 17-20, San
Francisco, CA.
Zurlage, M., Kertz, S.J, Chapman, L.K., Woodruff-Borden. (2007). Explanatory Models
ofAnxiety in Primary Care. Poster at the Annual American Psychological
Association Convention, August 17-20, San Francisco, CA.
Kniffley, S., Kertz, S. J., Chapman, L. K., Woodruff-Borden, J. (2007). An Analysis of
Parental Behaviors and Anxiety in Black and White Young Adults. Poster at the
University of Louisville Summer Research Opportunity Program, August 1st,
Louisville, KY.
Meltzer, M., Agwu, C., Greenberg, B., Kertz, S., Skelton, A., Vittengl, J.Wessel, A.,
Wooldridge, C. (2006). The Correlation Between Student Embracement of
the Liberal Arts and Expected Annual Income. Poster at the Midwestern
Psychological Association, May, Chicago IL.
Skelton, A., Agwu, C., Greenberg, B., Kertz, S., Meltzer, M., Vittengl, J., Wessel, A.,
Wooldridge, C. (2006). Exploring the Structure ofLiberal Arts
Acculturation and its Prediction of College Students' Well-being. Poster at the
Midwestern Psychological Association, May, Chicago, IL.

Clinical Experience
07/20 1O-present

Behavioral Health Partial Program

McLean Hospital

Supervisor: Throstur Bjorgvinsson, PhD

Worked in a CBT and DBT oriented skills based partial hospital program for individuals
with Axis I and Axis II personality disorders. Conducted six groups per week and met
with patients for individual skills coaching. Approximately five hours of supervision
were provided weekly.
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0812009-05/2010

University of Louisville

Psychological Services Center, Mindfulness and
Acceptance Based Behavior Therapy Treatment Team
Supervisor: Paul Salmon, Ph.D.

Several hours per week spent providing mindfulness and acceptance based treatments to
individuals with anxiety and depressive symptoms. Weekly group and individual
supervision meetings and mindfulness practice were also included.
0812006-07/2009

University of Louisville

Psychological Services Center, Cognitive-Behavioral
Therapy for Anxiety Disorders Team
Supervisor: Janet Woodruff-Borden, Ph. D.

Several hours per week focused on providing cognitive-behavioral treatment to
individuals with anxiety disorders and depression. Other responsibilities included
assessment, client reports, observing clients, and attending weekly supervision meetings.
0512007 -0512010
University of Louisville

Psychological Services Center, Assessment Practicum
Supervisors: Bernadette Walter, Ph.D. & David Winsch,
PhD.

Conducted advanced placement, Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder, and full
diagnostic assessments of children and adults. Activities included test administration,
scoring, interpretation, and the preparation of integrated reports. Results were also
presented to the client in a verbal feedback session.

04/08-05/08
University of Louisville

Girls Intervention Group - Wilkerson Elementary
School
Supervisor: Janet Woodruff-Borden, Ph.D.

Conducted 8 week intervention group designed to help at-risk girls ages 11 and 12
prepare for transition from elementary to middle school. Group met once per week for
two hours and focused on issues such as self-image, assertiveness, peer relationships, and
stress management.

06/2005-08/2005
Childcare Practicum
Edgewood Children's Center Supervisor: Anne Marie Potchen, M.S.W.
Worked with children suffering from emotional and behavior disorders, developed and
evaluated behavior modification plans, monitored behavioral and psychological status,
intervened in crisis situations, including the use of physical restraint, taught behavioral,
social and life skills.
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Teaching Experience
0812006-04/2007
University of Louisville

Teaching Assistant: Introductory Psychology
Supervisor: Edna Ross, Ph.D.

Taught six recitation sections over two semesters. Responsibilities included material
preparation, delivering lectures, grading assignments, assisting students, proctoring
exams, and recording and calculating grades.

Editorial Activities
Ad hoc reviewer, Journal ofAnxiety Disorders
Professional Talks
"Helping Your Child Cope with Stress and Worry." Presented at the Family Scholar
House, February 25 th , 2010.
"Cognitive Behavioral Treatment of Comorbid OCD and OCPD." Case Conference
Presentation, University of Louisville, March 25 th , 2009.
"Stress and Anxiety." Guest lecture at Jefferson Community College on the nature and
treatment of stress and anxiety disorders. April 24th , 2008.
"Student Involvement in Faculty Research: Making the Most out of Research Lab/Team
Experiences." Panel Discussion at the Kentucky Psychological Association Convention,
th
November 9 , 2007.
"Helping your child succeed in school." Workshop presented for parents at Semple
Elementary School, September 28 th , 2007.

Group Membership
2007-2010
2008
2007
2004-2006

Association for Behavior and Cognitive Behavior
Therapies
Association for Psychological Science
American Psychological Association
Psi Chi National Psychology Honor Society

Professional Development
2007
University of Louisville Depression Center Conference
2006
Volunteer at Kentucky Psychological Association
Convention
2006
Volunteer at Celebrating Women Conference
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